Sunday, April 23, 2017

Thucydides - The Peloponnesian War

I have not read Thucydides since college - in Dr. Gorge Ellsworth's Greek History Class.  That was back in 1972.  It was a hard read this time - as it was then, just at the end of the Vietnam War.  Thucydides speaks of the recurring nature of history: 

"But if he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied.  My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten." (p. 15)

It is an everlasting possession and an everlasting heart ache. 

I started listening to the Benjamin Jowett translation on "Audible" and enjoyed his presentation so much that I bought a copy of his 1881 publication and read it.  It was painful and beautiful, terrifying and true.  It seemed that everyday I found the latest headlines mirrored in the ancient text. 

I have selected 215 quotes.  The bold print introductions are my own words. There is an index after the quotes.  I hope it will be helpful in finding today in these words from yesterday.
Thucydides, translated by Benjamin Jowett, 1817-1893

Book I, pages 1 - 93

1. Importance of the War – No movement ever stirred Hellas more deeply than this; it was shared by many of the Barbarians, and might be said even to affect the world at large.  p. 1

2. Neolithic Times – The country which is now called Hellas was not regularly settled in ancient times.  The people were migratory, and readily left their homes whenever they were overpowered by numbers.  pp. 1-2

3. Immigration Benefits – Certainly Attica, of which the soil was poor and thin, enjoyed a long freedom from civil strife, and therefore retained its original inhabitants. And a striking confirmation of my argument is afforded by the fat that Attica through immigration increased in population more than any other region.  For the leading men of Hellas, when driven out of their own country by war or revolution, sought an asylum at Athens; and from the very earliest times, being admitted to rights of citizenship, so greatly increased the number of inhabitants that Attica became incapable of con5aining them, and was at last obliged to send out colonies to Ionia.  pp. 2-3

4. King Hellen Will Give His Name to the People – . . . I am inclined to think that the very name was not as yet given to the whole country, and in fact did not exist at all before the time of Hellen, the son of Deuclion; the different tribes, of which the Pelasgian was the most widely spread, gave their own names to different districts.  But when Hellen and his sons became powerful in Phthiotis, their aid was invoked by other cities, and those who associated with them gradually began to be called Hellenes . . .  p. 3

5. Second Amendment, Right to Carry – The fashion of wearing arms among these continental tribes is a relic of their old predatory habits.  For in ancient times all Hellenes carried weapons because their homes were undefended and intercourse was unsafe; like the Barbarians they went armed in their every-day life.  And the continuance of the custom in certain parts of the country proves that it once prevailed everywhere.  p. 4

6. Archeology – Only a Guess – When it is said that Mycenae was but a small place, or that any other city which existed in those days is inconsiderable in our own, this argument will hardly prove that the expedition was not as great as the poets related and as is commonly imagined.  Suppose the city of Sparta to be deserted and nothing left but the temples and the ground-plan, distant ages would be very unwilling to believe that the power of the Lacedaemonians was at all equal to their fame.  And yet they own two-fifths of eh Peloponnesus, and are acknowledged leaders of the whole, as well as of numerous allies in the rest of Hellas.  But their city is not regularly built and has no splendid temples or other edifices; it rather resembles a straggling village like the ancient towns of Hellas, and would therefore make a poor show.

7. Ship’s Rowers Are Warriors – That the crews were all fighting men as well as rowers he clearly implies when speaking of the ships of Philoctetes; for he tells us that all the oarsmen were likewise archers.  p. 8

8. Dorian Invasion – In the eightieth year after the war [Trojan War], the Dorians led by the Heraclidae conquered the Peloponnesus.  p. 9  

9. Corinth Built the First Trirems – The Corinthians are said to have first adopted something like the modern style of ship-building, and the oldest Hellenic triremes to have been constructed at Corinth.  P. 10 – BC 704

10. Sparta’s Good Laws – . . . nevertheless she [Sparta] obtained good laws at an earlier period than any other and has never been subject to tyrants; she has preserved the same form of government for rather more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the Peloponnesian War.  p. 12 – BC 804

11. Persian War – Process and Aftermath (Land and Sea) Hellenes Divided between Athens and Sparta – In the greatness of the impending danger, the Lacedaemonians, who were the most powerful state in Hellas, assumed the lead of the confederates.  The Athenians, as the Persian host advanced, resoled to forsake their city, broke up their homes, and, taking to their ships, became sailors.  The Barbarian was repelled by a common effort; but soon the Hellenes, as well those who had revolted from the King as those who formed the original confederacy, took different sides and became the allies either of the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians; for these were now the two leading powers, the one strong by land and the other by sea. pp. 12-13

12. Greatest War – And, though men will always judge any war in which they are actually fighting to be the greatest at the time, but, after it is over, revert to their admiration of some other which has preceded, still the Peloponnesian, if estimated by the actual facts, will certainly prove to have been the greatest ever known.  p. 15 – BC 404

13.  Thucydides on His Speeches – As to the speeches which were made either before or during the war, it was hard for me, and for others who reported them to me, to recollect the exact words.  I have therefore put into the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as I thought he would be likely to express them, while at the same time I endeavored, as nearly as I could, to give the general purport of what was actually said.  p. 15

14. Happen Again – But if he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied.  My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten.  p. 15

15. Colonies Estranged by Injustice – If they [Corinth] say that we [Corcyraeans] are their colony and that therefore you have no right to receive us, they should be made to understand that all colonies honor their mother-city when she treats them well, but are estranged from her by injustice.  p. 23 – BC 433

16, The Enemy of Your Enemy Is Your Friend – Above all, our enemies are your enemies, which is the best guarantee of fidelity in an ally; and they are not weak but well able to injure those who secede from them.  p. 24 – BC 453

17. Justice and Expedience – Do not say to yourselves that this is just, but that in the event of war something else is expedient; for the true path of expediency is the path of right.  (The Corinthian argument) p. 29 – BC 433

18. War Inevitable Anyway – For they knew that in any case the war with Peloponnesus was inevitable, and they had no mind to let Corcyra and her navy fall into the hands of the Corinthians.  p. 30 – BC 432 

19. Battle (Cheimerium) Described – The engagement was obstinate, but more courage than skill was displayed, and it had almost the appearance of a battle by land.  When two ships once charged on another it was hardly possible to part company, for the throng of vessels was dense, and the hopes of victory lay chiefly in the heavy-armed, who maintained a steady fight upon the decks, the ships meanwhile remained motionless.  There were no attempts to break the enemy’s line.   Brute force and rage made up for the want of tactics.  Everywhere the battle was a scene of tumult and confusion.  p. 32 – BC 432  

20. Corinthians Compare Athens to Sparta – Of all Hellenes, Lacedaemonians, you are the only people who never do anything . . . They are revolutionary, equally quick in the conception and in the execution of every new plan; while you are conservative—carful only to keep what you have, originating nothing and not acting even when action is necessary. . . For they hope to gain something by leaving their homes; but you are afraid that any new enterprise may imperil what you have already. . . but if they fail, they at once conceive new hopes and so fill up the void.  With them alone to hope is to have for they lose not a moment in the execution of an idea.  This is the life-long task, full of danger and toil, which they are always imposing upon themselves.  None enjoy their good things less, because they are always seeking for more.  To do their duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet of inaction to be as disagreeable as the most tiresome business. If a man should say of them, in a word, that they were born neither to have peace themselves no to allow peace to other men, he would simply speak the truth.   pp. 43-46 – BC 432

21. Athens Empire Develops – The subsequent deployment of our power was originally forced upon us by circumstances; fear was our first motive; afterwards ambition, and then interest stepped in.  p 48 – BC 432

22. Justice and Violence – Mankind resent injustice more than violence, because the one seems to be an unfair advantage taken by an equal, the other is the irresistible force of a superior.  p. 49

23. Archidamus King of Sparta – But Archidamus their king, who was held to be both an abel and a prudent man came forward and spoke as follows: -  pp. 50-51 – BC 432

24. Archidamus on War – At my age, Lacedaemonians, I have had experienced many wars, and I see several of you who are as old as I am, and who will not, as men too often do, desire war because they have never known it, or in the belief that it is either a good or a safe thing.  p. 51 – BC 432

25. Archidamus on Athenian Resolve to Keep Their Freedom – Nay, I fear that we shall bequeath it to our children; for the Athenians with their high spirit will never barter their liberty to save their land, or be terrified like novices at the sight of war.  p. 52 – BC 432  

26. Archidamus on Spartan Resolve – Remember that we have always been citizens of a free and most illustrious state, and that for us the policy which they condemn may well be truest good sense and discretion.  It is a policy which has saved us from growing insolent in prosperity or giving way under adversity, like other men.  We are not stimulated by the allurements of flattery into dangerous courses of which we disapprove; nor are we goaded by offensive charges into compliance with any man’s wishes.  We have not acquired that useless over-intelligence which makes a man an excellent critic of an enemy’s plans, but paralyses him in the moment of action.  We think that the wits of our enemies are as good as our own, and that the element of fortune cannot be forecast in words.  p. 53 – BC 432  

27. Archidamus on the Hardest School – We should remember that one man is much the same as another, and that he is best who is trained in the severest school.  pp. 53-54 – BC 432  

28. Themistocles on the Wall for Athens   He [Themistocles] then proposed that he himself start at once for Sparta and that they should give him colleagues who were not to go immediately, but were to wait until the wall reached the lowest height which could possibly be defended.  The whole people, men, women, and children, should join in the work and they must spare no building, private or public, which could be of use, but demolish them all.  p. 57 – BC 479

29. Themistocles on the Piraeus – Themistocles also persuaded the Athenians to finish the Piraeus, of which he had made a beginning in his year of office as Archon.  The situation of the place, which had three natural havens, was excellent; and now that the Athenians had become sailors, he thought that a good harbor would greatly contribute to the extension of their power.  p. 59 – BC 481?

30. Delos the Seat of the Alliance – The island of Delos was the treasury, and the meetings of the allies were held in the temple.  p. 61 – BC 477  

31. Long Walls – About this time the Athenians began to build their long walls extending to the sea, one to the harbor of Phalerum and the other to the Piraeus.  p. 66 – BC 460-457

32. Power of Athens Is Sparta’s Motivation – But the Athenians were growing too great to be ignored and were laying hands on their [Sparta’s] allies. They could now bear it no longer: they made up their minds that they must put out all their strength and overthrow the Athenian power by force of arms.  And therefore, they commenced the Peloponnesian War.  p. 72 – BC 439

33. Delphi’s Promise to Sparta – They had already voted in their own assembly that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were guilty; they now sent to Delphi and asked the god if it would be for their advantage to make war.  He is reported to have answered that, if they did their best, they would be conquerors, and that he himself, invited or uninvited, would take their part.  pp. 72 -73 – BC 432

34. War Sometimes Necessary – the Corinthians Call – And therefore let no one hesitate to accept war in exchange for peace.  Wise men refuse to move until they are wronged, but brave men as soon as they are wronged go to war, and when there is a good opportunity make peace again.  They are not intoxicated by military success: but neither will they tolerate injustice from a love of peace and ease.  For he who pleasure makes a coward will quickly lose if he continues inactive the delights of ease which he is so unwilling to renounce; and he whose arrogance is stimulated by victory does not see how hollow is the confidence which elates him.  pp. 73-74 – BC 432

35. Mercenaries Base of Athenian Power – The Athenian power consists of mercenaries, and not of their own citizens; but our soldiers are not mercenaries, and therefore cannot so be bought, for we are strong in men if poor in money.  p. 74 – BC 432

36. Naturel Gifts and Learned Skill – For that [courage] is a natural gift which they cannot learn but their superior skill is a thing acquired, which we must attain by practice.  p. 74 – BC 432

37. Dangers in War – Are we not open to one of three most serious charges--folly, cowardice, or carelessness?  p. 75 – BC 432

38. War Assures Peace – For by war peace is assured, but to remain at peace when you should be going to war may be often very dangerous. p. 77 – BC 432 

39. Sin of Killing Prisoners – When the Athenians, to whose charge the guard had been committed, saw them dying in the temple, they bade them rise, promising to do them no harm, and then led them away and put them to death.  They even slew some of them in the very presence of the awful Goddesses at whose altars, in passing by, they had sought refuge.  The murderers and their descendants are held to be accursed, and offenders against the Goddess [Athena – Goddess of Justice].  p. 78 – BC 620?

40. Pericles Praised – For he [Pericles] was the leader of the state and the most powerful man of his day, and his policy was utterly opposed to the Lacedaemonians.  He would not suffer the Athenians to give way, but was always urging upon them the necessity of war.  p. 79 – BC 432

41. Ephors Wall Up the Temple – Whereupon he [Former Spartan King, Pausanias – the son of Leonidas – who had made deals with the Persians.] ran and fled to the temple of Athene of the Brazen House and arrived before them, for the precinct was not far off. . . When his pursuers, who had failed in overtaking him, came up, they unroofed the building, and having made sure that he was within and could not get out, they built up the doors, and, investing the place, starved him to death.  p. 84 – BC 471

42. Learn the Language – The King is said to have been astonished at the boldness of his [Themistocles] character, and told him to wait a year as he proposed.  In the interval, he made himself acquainted as far as he could, with the Persian language and the manners of the country.  When the year was over, he arrived at the court and became a greater man there than any Hellene had ever been before.  pp. 86-87 – BC 465

43. Pericles Answer to Sparta’s Conditions for Peace – At last Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who was the first man of his day at Athens, and the greatest orator and statesman, came forward and advised as follows; p. 88 – BC 432

a) Never Yield – Athenians, I say, as I always have said, that we must never yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are persuaded to go to war in one temper of mind, and act when the time comes in another, and that their resolutions changed with the changes of fortune.  p. 88 – BC 432

b) Be Firm – You should have no lingering uneasiness about this; you are not really going to war for a trifle.  For in the seeming trifle is involved the trial and confirmation of your whole purpose. If you yield to them in a small matter, they will think that you are afraid, and will immediately dictate some more oppressive conditions, but if you are firm, you will prove to them that they must treat you as their equals.  p. 89 – BC 432

c)  Resources – That our resources are equal to theirs, and that we shall be as strong in the war, I will now prove to you in detail.  The Peloponnesians cultivate their own soil, and they have no wealth either public or private.  Nor have they any experience of long wars in countries beyond the sea; their poverty prevents them from fighting, except in person against each other and that for a short time.  pp. 89-90 – BC 432

d) Property and Owners – And men who cultivate their own lands are more ready to serve with their persons than with their property; they do not despair of their lives, but they soon grow anxious least their money should all be spent, especially if the war in which they are engaged is protracted beyond their calculations, as may well be the case.  p. 90 – BC 432

e) Weakness of Confederacy – The members of such a confederacy are slow to meet, and when they do meet, they give little time to the consideration of any common interest, and a great deal to schemes with further the interest of their particular schemes which further the interest of their particular state.  p. 90 – BC 432

f) Naval Skills Valuable – Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, not a thing to be cultivated by the way or at chance times; it is jealous of any other pursuit which distracts the mind for an instant from itself.  p. 91– BC 432

g) Mercenaries Unreliable – No mercenary will choose to fight on their side for the sake of a few days’ high pay, when he will not only be an exile, but will incur greater danger, and with have less hope of victory.  pp 91-92 – BC 432

h) Men More Important than Houses or Lands – Mourn not for houses and lands, but for men; men may gain these, but these will not gain men. p. 92 – BC 432

i) Don’t Try to Extend Empire – I have many other reasons for believing that you will conquer, but you must not be extending your empire.   p. 92 – BC 432

j) Answer to the Demands of the Lacedacmonians – That we will not exclude the Mergrians from our markets and harbors, if the Lacedacmonians will not exclude foreigners whether ourselves or our allies, from Sparta; for the treaty no more forbids the one than the other.  That we will concede independence to the cities, if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as the Lacedacmonians allow their subject states to be governed as they choose, not for the interest of Lacedaemon, but for their own.  Also that we are willing to offer arbitration according to the treaty.  And that we do not want to begin war, but intend to defend ourselves if attacked.  pp. 92-93 – BC 432

k) How to Win a War – Our fathers, when they withstood the Persian, had no such empire as we have; what little they had they forsook: not by good fortune but by wisdom, and not by power but by courage, they repelled the Barbarian and raised us to our present height of greatness.  We must be worthy of them, and resist our enemies with all our might, that we may hand down our empire unimpaired to posterity.  p. 93 – BC 432

Book II, pages 94 – 168

44. Beginnings, Full of Energy – On neither side were there any mean thoughts; they were both full of enthusiasm: and no wonder, for all men are energetic when they are making a beginning. At that time the youth of Peloponnesus and the youth of Athens were numerous; they had never seen war, and were therefore very willing to take up arms.  p. 99 – BC 431

45. Archidamus, King of Sparta, Speaks – When the whole army was assembled, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, and the leader of the expedition, called together the generals of the different states and their chief officers and most distinguished men, and spoke as follows ;–

a) Danger of Over Confidence in War – War is carried on in the dark; attacks are generally sudden and furious, and often the smaller army, animated by a proper fear, has been more than a match for a larger force which disdaining their opponent, were taken unprepared by him. When invading an enemy’s country, men should always be confident in spirit, but they should fear too, and take measures of precaution; and thus they will be at once most valorous in attack and impregnable in defense.  p. 101 – BC 431

b) Steps to Victory – Remembering how great this city is which you are attacking, and what a fame you will bring on your ancestors and yourselves for good or evil according to the result, follow whithersoever you are led; maintain discipline and caution above all things, and be on the alert to obey the word of command.  A great army is most assured of glory and safety when visibly animated by one spirit.  p. 101 – BC 431

46. Suspicion Against Pericles – While the Peloponnesians were gathering at the Isthmus, and were well on their way, but before they entered Attica, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten Athenian generals, knowing, that the invasion was inevitable, and suspecting that Archidamus in wasting the country might very likely spare his lands, ether out of courtesy and because he happened to be his friend, or by the order of the Lacedaemonian authorities (who had already attempted to raise a prejudice against him when they demanded the expulsion of the polluted family, and might take this further means of injuring him in the eyes of the Athenians), openly declared in the assembly that Archidamus was his friend, but not to the injury of the state, and that supposing the enemy did not destroy his lands and buildings like the rest, he would make a present of them to the public; and he desired that the Athenians would have no suspicion of him on that account.  pp. 102-103 – BC 431

47. Wealth of Athens – The state of their [Athens] finances was encouraging; they had on an average six hundred talents coming in annually from their allies, to say nothing of their other revenue; and there were still remaining in the Acropolis six thousand talents of coined silver.  (The whole amount had once been as much as nine thousand seven hundred talents, but from this had to be deducted a sum of three thousand seven hundred expended on various buildings, such as the Propylaea of the Acropolis, and also on the siege of Potidaea.)  Moreover there was uncoined gold and silver in the form of private and public offerings, sacred vessels used in processions and games, the Persian spoil and other things of the like nature, worth at least five hundred talents more.  There was also at their disposal, besides what they had in the Acropolis, considerable treasure in various temples.  If they were reduced to the last extremity they could even take off the plats of gold with which the image of the goddess was overlaid; these, as he pointed out, weighed forty talents, and were of refined gold, which was all removable.  p. 103 – BC 431  

48. Walls of Athens – The Phaleric wall extended four miles from Phalerum to the city walls: the portion of the city wall which was guarded was somewhat less than five miles; that between the Long Wall and the Phaleric requiring no guard.  The Long Walls running down to the Pireeus were rather more than four and a-half miles in length; the outer only was guarded.  The whole circuit of the Piraeus and of Munychia was not quite seven miles, of which half required a guard.  p. 104 – BC 431  

49. Theseus Sets Up the City – Theseus came to the throne, he, being a powerful as well as a wise ruler, among other improvements in the administration of the country, dissolved the councils and separate governments, and united all the inhabitants of Attica in the present city, establishing one council and town hall.  p. 105 – BC 431

50. Country Life – Thus for along the ancient Athenians enjoyed a country life in self-governing communities; and although they were now united in a single city, they and their descendants, down to the time of this war, from old habit generally resided with their households in the country where they had been born.  p. 106 – BC 431

51. Metics Also Fought – About the end of the summer the entire Athenian force, including the metics, invaded the territory of Mergara, under the command of Pericles the son of Zanthippus.  p. 114 – BC 431

52. Funeral Oration – During the same winter, in accordance with an old national custom, the funeral of those who first fell in this war was celebrated by the Athenians at the public charge. 

a) Cemetery (Note: Heroes of Marathon Buried on the Field) – The public sepulcher is situated in the most beautiful spot outside the walls; there they always bury those who fall in war; only after the battle of Marathon the dead, in recognition of their per-eminent valor, were interred on the field.  pp. 115-116 – BC 431 

b) Honor by Deeds – But I [Pericles] should have preferred that, when men’s deeds have been brave, they should be honored in deed only, and with such an honour as this public funeral, which you are now witnessing.  p. 116 – BC 431

c) Gift from Ancestors – I [Pericles] will speak first of our ancestors, for it is right and becoming that now, when we are lamenting the dead, a tribute should be paid to their memory.  There has never been a time when they did not inhabit this land, which by their valour they have handed down from generation to generation, and we have receive from them a free state.  p. 117 – BC 431

d) Gift from Fathers – But if they were worthy of praise, still more were our fathers, who added to their inheritance, and after many a struggle transmitted to us their sons their great empire.  p. 117 – BC 431

e) Gift from Ourselves – And we ourselves assembled here to-day, who are still most of us in the vigoro of life, have chiefly done the work of improvements, and have richly endowed our city with all things, so that she is sufficient for herself both in peace and war.  p. 117 – BC 431

f) Government, Democracy/Law/Merit – Our form of government does not enter into rivalry with the institutions of others. We do not copy our neighbors, but are an example to them.  It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few.  But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognized; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit. pp. 117-118 – BC 431

g) Equality of Opportunity – Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country whatever be the obscurity of his condition.  There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbor if he does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant.  p. 118 – BC 431 – BC 431

h) Freedom and Duty to Unwritten Laws – While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for authority and for the laws, having an especial regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured as well as to those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of them the reprobation of the general sentiment. p.118 – BC 431

i) Pleasure – And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year; at home the style of our life is refined; and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy.  p. 118 – BC 431

j) Trade – Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the whole earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the goods of other countries as freely as of our own.  p. 118 – BC 431

k) Military Training – Then, again, our military training is in many respects superior to that of our adversaries.  p. 118 – BC 431

l) Open City – Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him.  p. 118 – BC 431

m) Education – And in the matter of education, whereas they from early youth are always undergoing laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we live at ease, and yet are equally ready to face the perils which they face.  p. 118 – BC 431

n) Training Methods – . . . we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but without laborious training, and with a courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law, are we not greatly the gainers? p. 119 – BC 431

o) Love of Beauty – For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. p. 119 – BC 431

p) Service – In doing good, again, we are unlike others; we make our friends by conferring, not by receiving favors. . .  We alone do good to our neighbors not upon calculation of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit.  pp. 119-120 – BC 431

q) Fight for the City – For we have compelled every land and every sea to open a path for our valor, and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity.  Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought and died; they could not bear the thought that she might be taken from them; and every one of us who survive should gladly toil on her behalf.  p. 120 – BC 431

r) Love Athens - . . . fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her; and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonor always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but feely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which they could present at her feast.  p. 122 – BC 431

53) The Plague – They had not been there many days when the plague broke out at Athens for the first time. p. 124 – BC 431

a) Doctors Die – For a while physicians, in ignorance of the nature of the disease, sought to apply remedies; but it was in vain, and they themselves were among the first victims, because they oftenest came into contact with it.  p. 124 – BC 431

b) Thucydides had the Disease – But I shall describe its actual course, and the symptoms by which any one who knows them beforehand may recognize the disorder should it ever reappear.  For I was myself attacked, and witnessed the sufferings of others.  p. 125 – BC 430

c) Disease Described – The season was admitted to have been remarkable free from ordinary sickness; and if anybody was already ill of any other disease, it was absorbed in this.  Many who were in perfect health, all in a moment, and without any apparent reason, were seized with violent heats in the head and with redness and inflammation of the eyes.  Internally the throat and the tongue were quickly suffused with blood, and the breath became unnatural and fetid.  There followed sneezing and hoarseness; in a short time the disorder, accompanied by a violent cough, reached the chest; and then fastening lower down, it would move the stomach and bring on all the vomits of bile to which physicians have ever given names; and they were very distressing.  An ineffectual retching producing violent convulsions attacked most of the sufferers; some as soon as the previous symptoms had abated, others not until long afterwards.  The body externally was not so very hot to the touch, nor yet pale; it was of a livid color inclining to red, and breaking out in pustules and ulcers.  But the internal fever was intense; the sufferers could not bear to have on them even the finest linen garment; they insisted on being naked, and there was nothing which they longed for more eagerly than to throw themselves into cold water.  And many of those who had no one to look after them actually plunged into the cisterns, for they were tormented by unceasing thirst, which wasn’t in the least assuaged whether they drank little or much. They could not sleep; a restlessness which was intolerable never left them.  While the disease was at its height the body, instead of wasting away, held out amid these sufferings in a marvelous manner, and either they died on the seventh or ninth day, not of weakness, for their strength was not exhausted, but of internal fever, which was the end of most; or, if they survived, then the disease descended into the bowels and there produced violent ulceration; severe diarrhea at the same time  set in, and at a later stage caused exhaustion, which final with few exceptions carried them off.  For the disorder which had originally settled in the head passed gradually through the whole body, and, if a person got over the worst, would often seize the extremities and leave its mark, attacking the privy parts and the fingers and the toes; and some escaped with the loss of these some with the loss of their eyes.  Some again had no sooner recovered than they were seized with a forgetfulness of all things and knew neither themselves nor their friends.  pp. 125-126 – BC 430

d) Birds and Dogs Die – The malady took a form not to be described, and the fury with which it fastened upon each sufferer was too much for human nature to endure.  There was one circumstance in particular which distinguished it from ordinary diseases.  The birds and animals which feed on human flesh although so many bodies were lying unburied, either never came near them or died if they touched them.  This was proved by a remarkable disappearance of the birds of prey, who were not to be seen either about the bodies or anywhere else; while in the case of the dogs the fact was even more obvious because they live with man.  p. 126 – BC 430

e) No One Got It Twice – But whatever instances there may have been of such devotion, more often the sick and the dying were tended by the pitying care of those who had recovered, because they knew the course the disease and were themselves free from apprehension.  For no one was ever attacked a second time, or not with a fatal result.  All men congratulated them, and they themselves, in the excess of their joy at the moment, had an innocent fancy that they could not die of any other sickness.  p. 127 – BC 430

f)  Law, Human and Divine, Ignored – The temples in which they lodged were full of the corpses of those who died in the; for the violence of the calamity was such that men, not knowing where to turn, grew reckless of all law, human and divine.  p. 128 – BC 430

g)  Lawless – There were other and worse forms of lawlessness which the plague introduced to Athens.  Men who had hitherto concealed their indulgence in pleasure now grew bolder. For, seeing the sudden change, – how the rich died in a moment, and those who had nothing immediately inherited their property, – they reflected that life and riches were alike transitory, and they resolved to enjoy themselves while they could, and to think only of pleasure.  Who would be willing to sacrifice himself to the law of honor when he knew not whether he would ever live to be held in honor and of expedience.  No fear of God or law of man deterred a criminal.  p. 128 – BC 430

h) Religion Out – Those who saw all perishing alike, thought that the worship or neglect of the Gods made no difference.  For offences against human law no punishment was to be feared; no one would live long enough to be called to account.  Already a far heavier sentence had been passed and was hanging over a man’s head; before that fell, why should he not take a little pleasure?  p. 128 – BC 430

i) Prophesy Fulfilled – The answer of the oracle to the Lacedaemonians when the God was asked ‘whether they should go to war or not,’ and he replied ‘that if they fought with al ltheir might, they would conquer, and that he himself would take their part,’ was not forgotten by those who had heard of it and they quite imagined that they were witnessing the fulfilment of his words.  p. 129 – BC 430

54. Blame on Pericles – They blamed Pericles because he had persuaded them to go to war, declaring that he was the author of their troubles; and they were anxious to come to terms with the Lacedaemonians.  p. 130 – BC 430

55. Pericles Last Speech – At this assembly he came forward and spoke as follows: –

a) Never Give Up – Nevertheless, being the citizens of a great city and educated in a temper of greatness, you should not succumb to calamities however overwhelming, or darken the luster of your fame.  pp. 133-134 – BC 430

b) Masters of the Sea – You think that your empire is confined to your allies, but I say that of the two divisions of the world accessible to man, the land and the sea, there is one of which you are absolute masters, and have, or may have, the dominion to any extent which you please.  Neither the great King nor any nation on earth can hinder a navy like yours for penetrating whithersoever you choose to sail.  p. 133 – BC 430  

c) Freedom  . . . and you may be sure that if we cling to our freedom and preserve that, we shall soon enough recover all the rest.  But, if we are the servants of others, we shall be sure to lose not only freedom, but all that freedom gives.  p. 133 – BC 430

d)  War Based on Reason – Any coward or fortunate fool may brag and vaunt, but he only is capable of disdain whose conviction that he is stronger than his enemy rests, like our own, on reason.  p. 134 – BC 430

e) Glory Takes Work – Once more, you are bound to maintain the imperial dignity of your city in which you all take pride; for you should not covet the glory unless you will endure the toil.  p. 134 – BC 430

f) Tyranny of Empire – Neither can you resign your power, if, at this crisis, any timorous or inactive spirit is for thus playing the honest man.  For by this time your empire has become a tyranny which in the opinion of mankind may have been unjustly gained, but which cannot be safely surrendered.  p. 134 – BC 430

g) Don’t Blame Me – You must not be led away by the advice of such citizens as these, nor be angry with me; for the resolution in favor of war was your own as much as mine.  What if the enemy has come and done what he was certain to do when you refused to yield?  What too if the plague followed?  That was an unexpected blow, but we might have foreseen all the rest.  I am well aware that your hatred of me is aggravated by it.  But how unjustly, unless to me you also ascribe the credit of any extraordinary success which may befall you!  pp. 134-135 – BC 430

h) Fickleness of the Masses – The popular indignation was not pacified until they had fined Pericles; but, soon afterwards, with the usual fickleness of the multitude, they elected hi general and committed all their affairs to his charge.  p. 136 – BC 430

i) The death of Pericles – He survived the commencement of hostilities two years and six months; p. 136 – BC 430

56. Winning and Losing - . . . he had told the Athenians that if they would be patient and would attend to their navy, and not seek to enlarge their dominion while the war was going on, nor imperil the existence of the city, they would be victorious; but they did all that he told them not to do, and in matters which seemingly had nothing to do with the war from motives of private ambition and private interest they adopted a policy which had disastrous effect in respect both of themselves and of their allies; their measures, had they been successful would only have brought honor and profit to individuals, and, when unsuccessful, crippled the city in the conduct of the war.  p. 136 – BC 430

57. Pericles Greatness – The reason of the difference was that he, deriving authority from his capacity and acknowledged worth, being also a man of transparent integrity, was able to control the multitude in a free spirit; he led them rather than was led by them; for, not seeking power by dishonest arts, he had no need to say pleasant things but, on the strength of his own high character, could venture to oppose and even to anger them.  When he saw them unreasonably elated and arrogant, his words humbled and awed them; and, when they were depressed by groundless fears, he sought to reanimate their confidence.  Thus Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen.  p. 137 – BC 430

58. Successor’s Failure – But his [Pericles] successors were more on an equality with one another, and each one struggling to be first himself, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the people.  Such weakness in a great and imperial city led to many errors, of which the greatest was the Sicilian expedition; not that the Athenians miscalculated their enemy’s power, but they themselves, instead of consulting for the interests of the expedition which they had sent out, were occupied in intriguing against one another for the leadership of the democracy, and who not only grew remiss in the management of the army, but became embroiled, for the first time, in civil strife.  p. 137 – BC 430

*59. Defeated, How Athens Lost, Persia Involvement – And yet after they had lost in the Sicilian expedition the greater part of their fleet and army, and were distracted by revolution at home still they held out three years not only against their former enemies, but against the Sicilians who had combined with them, and against most of their own allies who had combined with them, and against most of their own allies who had risen in revolt.  Even when Cyrus the son of the King joined in the war and supplied the Peloponnesian fleet with money, they continued to resist, and were at last overthrown, not by their enemies, but by themselves and their own internal dissensions.  p. 137 – BC 430

60. War Crimes – On the very day of their arrival the Athenians, fearing that Aristeus, who they considered to be the cause of all their troubles at Potidaea and in Chalcidice, would do them still further mischief if he escaped, put them all to death without trial and without hearing what they wanted to say; they then threw their bodies down a precipice.  They considered that they had a right to retaliate on the Lacedaemonians, wo had begun by treating in the same way the traders of the Athenians and their allies when they caught their vessels off the coast of Peloponnesus.  For at the commencement of the war, all whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea were treated by them as enemies and indiscriminately slaughtered, whether they were allies of the Athenians or neutrals.  p. 139 – BC 430

Book III, pages 169 – 245

61. Mitylenaeans Debate Alliance with Athens – Since an alliance is our object, we will first address ourselves to the question of justice and honors.  We know that no friendship between man and man, no league between city and city, can ever be permanent unless the friends or allies have a good opinion of each other’s honesty, and are similar in general character.  For the diversity in men’s minds makes the difference in their actions.  p. 173 – BC 428

62. Mitylenaean’s Alliance Conditional, Things Changed – But we were never the allies of the Athenians in their design for subjugating Hellas; we were really the allies of the Hellenes, whom we sought to liberate from the Persian . . . What trust then could we repose in such a friendship or such a freedom as this?  The civility which we showed to one another was at variance with our real feelings.  They courted us in time of war because they were afraid of us, and we in time of peace paid a like attention to them.  And the faith which is generally assured by mutual good-will had with us no other bound but mutual fear; for fear, and not for love, we were constrained to maintain the alliance, and whichever of us first thought that he could safely venture would assuredly have been the first to break it.     p. 174-175 – BC 428

63. Preemptive War; First Strike Justification – And therefore if any one imagines that we do wrong in striking first, because they delay the blow which we dread, and thinks thatwe should wait and make quite sure of their intentions, he is mistaken.  If we are on an equality with them, and in a position to counteract their designs and imitate their threatening attitude, how is it consistent with this equality that we must still be to their mercy?  The power of attack is always in their hands, and the power of anticipating attack should always be in ours.  p. 175 – BC 428

64. Show of Strength; the Metics Fight. – They manned a hundred ships, in which they embarked, both metics and citizens, all but the highest class and the Knights: they then set sail, and, after displaying their strength along the shores of the Isthmus, made descents upon the Peloponnesian coast wherever they pleased.  p. 178 – BC 428

65. The Athenian Fleet – At the time when the fleet was at sea, the Athenians had the largest number of ships which they ever had all together, effective and in good trim, although the mere number was as large or even large at the commencement of the war.  For then there were a hundred which guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, and another hundred which were cruising off Peloponnesus, not including the ships employed in blockading Potidaea and at other places; so that in one and the same summer their fleet in all numbered two hundred and fifty.  p. 178 – BC 428

66. Hoplites Row the Boats – So about the beginning of autumn they sent to Mitylene, under the command of Paches the son of Epicurus, a thousand Athenian hoplites who handled the oars themselves.  p. 179 – BC 428

67. Using Math to Prepare for Battle – They [Athenians] first made ladders equal in length to the height of the enemy’s wall, which they calculated by help of the layers of bricks on the side facing the town, at a place where the wall had accidentally not been plastered.  A great many counted at once, and, although some might make mistakes the calculation would be oftener right than wrong; for they repeated the process again and again, and, the distance not being great, they could see the wall distinctly enough for their purpose.  In this manner they ascertained the proper length of the ladders, taking as a measure the thickness of the bricks.  p. 180 – BC 428 

68. Commons Revolt Once Armed. – Salaethus himself began to despair of the arrival of the ships, and therefore he put into the hands of the common people (who had hitherto been light-armed) shields and spears, intending to lead them out against the Athenians.  But, having once received arms, they would no longer obey their leaders; they gathered into knots and insisted that the nobles should bring out the corn and let all share alike; if not, they would themselves negotiate with the Athenians and surrender. p. 185 – BC 427

69. General’s Key to Success – The danger should not deter us; for we should consider that the execution of a military surprise is always dangerous, and that the general who is never taken off his guard himself, and never loses an opportunity of striking at an unguarded foe, will be most likely to succeed in war. p. 186 – BC 427

70. Mitylenaeans to Be Killed – Concerning the other captives a discussion was held, and in their indignation the Athenian determined to put to death not only the men then at Athens, but all the grown-up citizens of Mitylene, and to enslave the women and children; the act of the Mitylenaeans appeared inexcusable, because they were not subjects like the other states which had revolted but free. p. 189 – BC 427

71. Remorse about Mitylenaeans – But on the following day a kind of remorse seized them; they began to reflect that a decree which doomed to destruction not only the guilty, but a whole city, was cruel and monstrous. p. 189 – BC 427

72. Cleon’s Speech Calling for the Death of the Mitylenaeans . . . Cleon the son of Cleaenetus had carried the decree condemning the Mitylenaeans to death.  . . . he came forward a second time and spoke as follows: –  I have remarked again and again that a democracy cannot manage an empire, but never more than now, when I see you regretting your condemnation of the Mitylenaeans.  Having no fear or suspicion of one another in daily life, you deal with your allies upon the same principle, and you do not consider that whenever you yield to them out of pity or are misled by their specious tales, you are guilty of a weakness dangerous to yourselves, and receive no thanks from them.  You should remember that your empire is a despotism exercised over unwilling subjects, who are always conspiring against you; they do not obey in return for any kindness which you do them to your own injury, but in so far as you are their master; they have no love of you, but they are held down by force.  Besides, what can be more detestable than to be perpetually changing our minds?  We forget that a state is which the laws, though imperfect, are unalterable, is better off than one in which the laws are good but powerless. p. 190 – BC 427

73. Cleon Warns of the Dangers of Persuasive Speakers – In such rhetorical contests the city gives away the prizes to others, while she takes the risk upon herself.  And you are to blame, for you order these contests amiss.  When speeches are to be heard, you are too fond of using your eyes, but, where actions are concerned you trust your ears; you estimate the possibility of future enterprises from the eloquence of an orator but as to accomplished facts, instead, of accepting ocular demonstration, you believe only what ingenious critics tell you.  No men are better dupes, sooner deceived by novel notions or slower to follow approved advice.  You despise what is familiar while you are worshippers of every new extravagance.  p. 191 – BC 427

74. Despise v Respect (Cleon) – Yet it is not too late to punish them as their crimes deserve.   And do not absolve the people while you throw the blame upon the nobles.  For they were all of one mind when were attacked.  Had the people deserted the nobles and come over to us, they might at this moment have been reinstated in their city; but they considered that their safety lay in sharing the dangers of the oligarchy, and therefore they joined in the revolt.  p. 193 – BC 427

75. Stick to Your Decisions (Cleon) – This was my original contention, and I will maintain that you should abide by your former decision and not be misled either by pity, or by the charm of words, or by a too forgiving temper.  There are no three things more prejudicial to your power.  Mercy should be reserved for the merciful, and not thrown away upon those who will have no compassion on us, and who must by the force of circumstance always be our enemies.  pp. 193-194 – BC 427

76. Just & Expedient (Cleon) – In one word, if you do as I say you will do what is just to the Mitylenaeans, and also what is expedient for yourselves; but if you take the opposite course, they will not be grateful to you, and you will be self-condemned.  For, if they were right in revolting, you must be wrong in maintaining your empire.  But if, right or wrong, you are resolved to rule, then rightly or wrongly they must be chastised for your good.  Otherwise you must give up your empire, and, when virtue is no longer dangerous, you may be as virtuous as you please.  p. 194 – BC 427

77. Diodotus Speech in Defense of the Mitylenaeans and of Debate – Such were the words of Cleon: and after him Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who in the previous assembly had been the chief opponent of the decree which condemned the Mitylenaeans, came forward again and spoke as follows:– I am far from blaming those who invite us to reconsider our sentence upon the Mitylenaeans, nor do I approve of the censure which has been cast on the practice of deliberating more than once about matters so critical.  p. 195 – BC 427

78. Two Things Adverse to Good Council, Haste and Passion (Diodotus) – In my opinion the two things most adverse to good counsel are haste and passion; the former is generally a mark of folly, the latter of vulgarity and narrowness of mine.  When a man insists that words ought not to be our guides in action, he is either wanting in sense or wanting in honesty: he is wanting in sense if he does not see that there is no other way in which we can throw light on the unknown future; and he is not honest if, seeking to carry a discreditable measure, and knowing that he cannot speak well in a bad cause, he reflects that he can slander well and terrify his opponents and his audience by the audaciousness of his calumnies.  p. 195 – BC 427

79. Evil Power of Slander (Diodotus) – Worst of all are those who, besides other topics of abuse declare that their opponent is hired to make an eloquent speech.  If they accuse him of stupidity only, when he failed in producing an impression he might go his way having lost his reputation for sense but not for honesty; whereas he who is accused of dishonesty, even if he succeed, is viewed with suspicion, and, if he fall, is thought to be both fool and rogue.  pp. 195-196 – BC 427

80. Argument Not Accusation and Slander - Suspicion (Diodotus) – It has come to this, that the best advice when offered in plain terms is as much distrusted as the worst; and not only he who wishes to lead the multitude into the most dangerous cause must deceive them, but he who speaks in the cause of right must make himself believed by lying.  In this city, and in this city only, to do good openly and without deception is impossible, because you are too clever; and, when a man confers an unmistakable benefit on you, he is rewarded by a suspicion that, in some underhand manner, he gets more than he gives.  p. 196 – BC 427

81. Responsible of Those in the Know (Diodotus) – But, whatever you may suspect, when great interests are at stake, we who advise ought to look further and weigh our words more carefully than you whose vision is limited.  And you should remember that we are accountable for our advice to you, but you who listen are accountable to nobody.  p. 196 – BC 427

82. Our Interests; Justice and Expedience (Diodotus) – I do not come forward either as an advocate of the Mitylenaeans or as their accuser; the question for us rightly considered is not; what are their crimes? but, what is for our interest?  p. 197 – BC 427

82a. Diodotus Speaks for Sparing the Mitylenaeans (Diodotus) – If I prove them ever so guilty, I will not on that account bid you put them to death, unless it be clearly for the good of the state.  For I conceive that we are now concerned, not with the present, but with the future.  When Cleon insists that the infliction of death will be expedient and will secure you against revolt in time to come, I, like him taking the ground of future expedience, stoutly maintain the contrary position; and I would not have you be misled by the apparent fairness of his proposal, and reject the solid advantage of mine.  You are very angry with the Mitylenaeans, and the superior justice of this argument may for the moment attract you; but we are not at law with them, and do not want to be told what is just; we are considering a matter of policy, and desire to know how we can turn them to account.  p. 197 – BC 427

83. Death Penalty Not a Deterrent (Diodotus) – All are by nature prone to err both in public and in private life, and no law will prevent them.  Men have gone through the whole catalogue of penalties in the hope that, but increasing their severity, they may suffer less at the hands of evil-doers.  In early ages the punishment, even of the worst offences would naturally be milder; but as time went on and mankind continued to transgress, they seldom stopped short of death.  And still there are transgressors.  Some greater terror than has yet to be discovered; certainly, death deters nobody.  . . . In a word then, it is impossible, and simply absurd to suppose, that human nature when bent upon some favorite project can be restrained either by the power of law or by any other terror.  pp. 197-198 – BC 427

84. Give Them a Way Out or They Will Never Give in. (Diodotus) – We ought not therefore to act hastily out of a mistaken reliance on the security which the penalty of death affords.  Nor should we drive our rebellious subjects to despair; they must not think that there is no place for repentance, or that they may not at any moment wipe out their offense.  p. 198 – BC 427

85. Allowing Repentance More Expedient (Diodotus) – Consider: at present, although a city may actually have revolted, when she becomes conscious of her weakness she will capitulate while still able to defray the cost of the war and to pay tribute for the future; but if we are too severe, will not the citizen make better preparations, and, when besieged, resist to the last, knowing that it is all the same whether they come to terms early or late? pp. 198-199 – BC 427 

86. A Better Way Than Severity (Diodotus) – Do not hope to find a safeguard in the severity of your laws, but only in the vigilance of your administration.  At present we do just the opposite; a free people under a strong government will always revolt in the hope of independence; and when we have put them down we think that they cannot be punished too severely.  But instead of inflicting extreme penalties on free men who revolt, we should practice extreme vigilance before they revolt, and never allow such a thought to enter their minds.  When however they have been once put down we ought to extenuate their crimes as much as possible.   p. 199 – BC 427

87. Mercy Better Than Justice (Diodotus) – But if you destroy the people of Mitylene who took no part in the revolt, and who voluntarily surrendered the city as soon as they got arms into their hands; in the first place they were your benefactors, and to slay them would be a crime; in the second place you will play into the hands of the ruling oligarchies, who henceforward, when they can induce a city to revolt, will at once have the people on their side; for you will have proclaimed to all that the innocent and the guilty will share the same fate.  Even if they were guilty you should wink at their conduct, and not allow the only friends whom you have left to be converted into enemies.  Far more conducive to the maintenance of our empire would it be to suffer wrong willingly, then for the sake of justice to put to death those whom we had better spare.  Cleon may speak of a punishment which is just and also expedient, but you will find that, in any proposal like his, the two cannot be combined.  pp. 199-200 – BC 427

88. The Plataeans Seek Justice from Sparta – Men of Lacedaemon, we surrendered our city because we had confidence in you; we were under the impression that the trial to which we submitted would be legal, and of a very different kind from this; and when we accepted you and you alone to be our judges which indeed you are, we thought that at your hands we had the best hope of obtaining justice.  But we fear that we are doubly mistaken, having too much reason to suspect that in this trial our lives are at stake and that you will turn out to be partial judges. p. 203 – BC 427

89. The Plataeans’ Defense – During the late peace and in the Persian War our conduct was irreproachable; we were not the first to violate the peace, and we were the only Boeotian who took part in the repelling the Persian invader and in the liberation of Hellas.  Although we are an inland city,  we joined in the sea-fight of Artemisium; we were at your side when you fought in our land under Pausanias, and, whatever dangers the Hellenes underwent in those days, we took a share beyond our strength in all of them.  p. 204 – BC 427

90. The Plataeans Appeal to the Law of Arms – Before you pass judgment, consider that we surrendered ourselves, and stretched out our hands to you; the custom of Hellas does not allow the suppliant to be put to death.  p. 207 – BC 427

91. Reasons for Mercy – These things O Lacedaemonians,  would not be for your honour.   They would be an offence against the common feeling of Hellas and against your ancestors.  You should be ashamed to put us to death, who are your benefactors and have never done you any wrong, in order that you may gratify the enmity of another.  Spare us, and let your heart be softened toward us; be wise, and have mercy upon us, considering not only how terrible will be our fate, but who the sufferers are; think to of the uncertainty of fortune, which may strike any one however innocent.  p. 207 – BC 427

92. Theban Excuse for Siding with Persia – The rulers of the state, hopping to strengthen their private interest if the Persians won, kept the people down and brought him in.  The city at large, when she acted thus, was not her own mistress; and she cannot be fairly blamed for and error which she committed when she had no constitution.  p. 209 – BC 427

93. Theban Condemnation of the Plataeans – Do not let your hearts be softened by tales about their ancient virtues, if they ever had any; such virtues might plead for the injured but should bring a double penalty on the authors of a base deed, because they are false to their own character.  p. 213 – BC 427

94. Murder of the Plataeans – They put to death not less than two hundred Plataeans, as well as twenty-five Athenians who had shared with them in the siege; and made slaves of the women. p. 214 – BC 427

95. Murder in the Senate – The culprits, knowing that the law was against them, and perceiving that Peithias as long as he remained in the senate would try to induce the people to make an alliance offensive and defensive with Athens, conspired together, and , rushing into the council chamber with daggers in their hands, slew him and others to the number of sixty, as well private persons as senators.  p. 216 – BC 427

96. Evils of Revolution – Murder of Prisoners – Eurymedon after his arrival remained with his sixty ships, the Corcyraens continued slaughtering those of their fellow-citizens whom they deemed their enemies; the professed to punish them for their designs against the democracy, but in fact some were killed for motives of personal enmity, and some because money was owing to them, by the hand of their debtors.  Every form of death was to be seen, and everything, and more than everything that commonly happens in revolutions, happened then.  The father slew the son, and the suppliants were torn from the temples, and slain near them; some of them were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus, and there perished.  To such extremes of cruelty did revolution go; and this seemed to be the worst of revolutions, because it was the first. p. 221 – BC 427

97. Calamities of War, Evils of Revolution – And revolution brought upon the cities of Hellas many terrible calamities, such as have been and always will be while human nature remains the same but which are more or less aggravated and differ in character with every new combination of circumstances.  In peace and prosperity both states and individuals are actuated by higher motives, because they do not fall under the dominion of imperious necessities; but war which takes away the comfortable provision of daily life is a hard master, and tends to assimilate men’s characters to their conditions.  p. 222 – BC 427

98. Changing the Meaning of Words – The meaning of words had no longer the same relation to things, but was changed by them as they thought proper.  Reckless daring was held to be loyal courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness; to know everything was to do nothing.  Frantic energy was the true quality of a man.  . . . The seal of good faith was not divine law, but fellowship in crime.   . . . Revenge was dearer than self-preservation.  Any agreements sworn to by either party, when they could do nothing else, were binding as long as both were powerless.  . . .  In general the dishonest more easily gain credit for cleverness than the simple for goodness; men take a pride in the one, but are ashamed of the other. pp. 222 – 223 – BC 427

99. “Party” and Love of Power, the Cause of Evil – The cause of all these evils was the love of power, originating in avarice and ambition, and the party-spirit which is engendered by them when men are fairly embarked in a contest.  For the leaders of either side used specious names, the one party professing to uphold the constitutional equality of the many, the other the  wisdom of the aristocracy, while them made the public interests, to which in name they were devoted, in reality their prize.  Striving in every way to overcome each other, they committed the most monstrous crimes; yet even these were surpassed by the magnitude of their revenges which they pursued to the very utmost, neither party observing any definite limits either of justice or public expediency, but both alike making the caprice of the moment their law. p. 223 – BC 427

100. Inferior Intellects Succeeded Best – Inferior intellects general succeeded best.  For, aware of their own deficiencies, and fearing the capacity of their opponents, for whom they were no match in powers of speech, and whose subtle wit were likely to anticipate them in contriving evil, they struck boldly and at once.  p. 224 – BC 427

101. Covetousness and Enmity – Socialism and Blind Hate – There were the dishonest designs of others who were longing to be relieved form their habitual poverty, and were naturally animated by a passionate desire of their neighbor’s goods; and there were crimes of another class which men commit, not from covetousness, but from the enmity with equals foster toward one another until they are carried away by their blind rage into the extremes of pitiless cruelty. p. 224 – BC 427

102. Sicilian City Calls for Athenian Help – The Leontines and their allies sent to Athens, and on the ground, partly of an old alliance, partly of their Ionian descent, begged the Athenians to send them ships, for they were driven off both sea and land by their Syracusan enemies. p. 226 – BC 427

103. Impact of the Plague – In the following winter the plague, which had never entirely disappeared, although abating for a time, again attacked the Athenians.  It continued on this second occasion not less than a year, having previously lasted for two years.  To the power of Athens certainly nothing was more ruinous; not less than four thousand four hundred Athenian hoplites who were on the roll died, and also three hundred horsemen, and an incalculable number of common people. p. 226 – BC 427

104. Melos – They also sent sixty ships and two thousand hoplites to Melos, under the command of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, wishing to subdue the Melians, who, although they were islanders, resisted them and would not join their alliance. p. 228 – BC 426

Book IV, pages 246-337

105. Preemptive War – The Syracusans took part in this affair chiefly because they saw that Messene was the key to Sicily.  They were afraid that the Athenians would one day establish themselves there and come and attack them with a larger force.  p. 246 – BC 425

106. To Keep Them Busy – the Soldiers Build a Fort – The weather was unfit for sailing; he was therefore compelled to remain doing nothing; until at length the soldiers, who were standing about idle, were themselves seized with a desire to fortify the place forthwith.   So they put their hands to the work; and, being un-provided with iron tools, brought stones which they picked out and put them together as they happened to fit; if they required to use mortar, having no hods, they carried it on their backs which they bent so as to form a resting-place for it, clasping their hands behind them that it might not fall off.  By every means in their power they hurried on the weaker points, wanting to finish them before the Lacedaemonians arrived. p. 248 – BC 425

107. Athenian – v – Lacedaemonian Military Excellence – For in those days it was the great glory of the Lacedaemonians to be an inland people distinguished for their military prowess, and of the Athenians to be a nation of sailors and the first naval power in Hellas. p. 253 – BC 425 

108. Sparta Offers Peace, the Chances of War – We were neither stronger nor weaker than before, but we erred in judgment, and to such errors all men are liable.  Therefore you should not suppose that, because your city and your empire are powerful at this moment, you will always have fortune on your side.  The wise ensure their own safety by not making too sure of their gains, and when disasters come they can tell better where they are; they know that war will go on its way whithersoever chance may lead, and will not be bound by the rules which he who begins to meddle with it would fain prescribe.  They of all men will be least likely to meet with reverses, because they are not puffed up with military success, and they will be most inclined to end the struggle in the hour of victory.  It will be for your honour, Athenians, to act thus toward us.  And then the victories which you have gained already cannot be attributed to mere luck; as they certainly will be if, rejecting our prayer, you should hereafter encounter disasters, a thing which is not unlikely to happen.  But you may if you will leave to posterity a reputation for power and wisdom which no danger can affect.   The Lacedemonians invite you to make terms with them and to finish the war.  They offer peace and alliance and a gereral friendly and happy relation, and they ask in return their countrymen who are cut off in the island.  pp. 257-258 – BC 425

109. Fruits of Peace – If you decide for peace, you may assure yourselves the lasting friendship of the Lacedaemonians freely offered by them, you on your part employing no force but kindness only.  Consider the great advantages which such a friendship will yield.  If you and we are at one, you may be certain that the rest of Hellas, which is less powerful than we, will pay to both of us the greatest deference. P. 259 – BC 425

110. Cleon’s Evil Advice Kills the Peace – This proposal was assailed by Cleon in unmeasured language: he had always know, he said, that they meant no good, and now their designs were unveiled; for they were unwilling to speak a word before the people, but wanted to be closeted with a select few; if they had any honesty in them, let them say what they wanted to the whole city.  But the Lacedaemonians knew that, although they might be willing to make concessions under the pressure of their calamities, they could not speak openly before the assembly, (for if they spoke and did not succeed, the terms which they offered might injure them in the opinion of their allies); they saw too that the Athenians would not grant what was asked of them on any tolerable conditions.  So, after a fruitless negotiation, they returned home.  p. 260 – BC 425 

111. Danger of “Guerilla War” - . . . he feared that the nature of the country would give the enemy an advantage.  For, however large the force with which he landed, the Lacedaemonians might attack him from some place of ambush and do him much injury.  Their mistakes and the character of their forces would be concealed by the wood; whereas all the errors made by his own army would be palpable, and so the enemy, with whom the power of attack would rest, might come upon them suddenly wherever they liked.  p. 266 – BC 425

112. Rowers (Oarsmen) Also Soldiers, Not Slaves! – When the dawn appeared, the rest of the army began to disembark.  They were the crews of rather more than seventy ships, including all but the lowest rank of rowers, variously equipped.  p. 268 – BC 425

113. Value of Missile Weapons – The Athenian hoplites were right in front, and the Lacedaemonians advanced against them, wanting to come to close quarters; but having light-armed adversary’s both on their flank and rear, they could not get at them or profit by their own military skill, for they were impeded by a shower of missiles from both sides. p. 269 – BC 425

114. Thermopylae All Over Again – To Compare Small Things with Great - . . . he [the Messenian General] and his men with great difficulty got round unseen and suddenly appeared in the rear, striking panic into the astonished enemy and redoubling the courage of his own friends who were watching for his reappearance.  The Lacedaemonians were now assailed on both sides, and to compare a smaller thing to a greater were in the same case with their own countrymen at Thermopylae.  p. 271 – BC 425

115. Spartan Surrender – The Lacedaemonians bid you act as you think best, but you are not to dishonor yourselves.  Where upon they consulted together, and then gave up themselves and their arms.  p. 272 – BC 425

116. Cleon Fulfills His Promise – And the mad promise of Cleon was fulfilled; for he did bring back the prisoners within twenty days as he had said.  p. 273 – BC 425

117. The Corcyraeans Murder the Oligarchs – The Corcyraeans took the prisoners and shut them up in a large building; then leading them out in bands of twenty at a time, they made them pass between two files of armed men; they were bound to one another and stuck and pierced by the men on each side, whenever anyone saw among them an enemy of his own; and there were men with whips, who accompanied them to the palace of execution and quickened the steps of those who lingered.  In this manner they brought the prisoners out of the building, and slew them to the number of sixty undiscovered by the rest, who thought they were taking them away to some other place.  . . . The prisoners sought to shelter themselves as they best could.  Most of them at the same time put an end to their own lives’ some thrust into their throats arrows which were shot at them, others strangled themselves with cords taken from beds which they found in the place, or with strips which they tore from their own garments.  This went on during the greater part of the night, which had closed upon their sufferings, until in one way or another, either by their own hand or by missiles hurled form above, they all perished.  pp. 277-278 – BC 425

118. Why War – You will know, and therefore I shall not rehearse to you at length, all the misery of war.  Nobody is compelled to go to war by ignorance, and no one who thinks that he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear.  The truth is that the aggressor deems the advantage to be greater than the suffering; and the side which is attacked wild sooner run any risk than suffer the smallest immediate loss.  pp. 283-284 – BC 424

119. Why Don’t We Make Peace? – And why, if peace is acknowledged by all to be the greatest of blessings, should we not make peace among ourselves?  pp. 285-286 – BC 424

120. Revenge Not Good, No Guarantee of Victory – For he knows that many a man before now who has sought a righteous revenge, far from obtaining it, has not even escaped himself; and many an one who in the consciousness of power has grasped at what was another’s, has ended by losing what was his own.  The revenge of the wrong is not always successful merely because it is just; nor is strength most assured of victory when it is most full of hope.  p. 286 – BC 424

121. Fortune Beyond Control – Nor am I so obstinate and foolish as to imagine that, because I am master of my own will, I can control fortune, of whom I am not master; but I am disposed to make reasonable concessions.  (Hermocrates) p. 287 – BC 424

122. Generals Punished for Making Peace – The cities in alliance with Athens sent for the Athenian generals and told them that a treaty was about to be made in which they might join if they pleased.  They assented; the treaty was concluded; and the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily.  When the generals returned the Athenians punished two of the, Pythodorus and Sophocles, with exile, and imposed a fine on the third, Eurymedon, believing that they might have conquered Sicily but had been bribed to go way. Pp. 287-288 – BC 424

123. Brasidas to the Men of Acanthus, Liberty Against One’s Will (Not a bad speaker, for a Spartan.) – Men of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me out at the head of this army to justify the declaration which we made at the beginning of the war—that we were going to fight against the Athenians for the liberties of Hellas.  . . . We Lacedaemonians thought that we were coming to those who even before we came in act were our allies in spirit, and would joyfully receive us; having this hope we have braved the greatest dangers, marching for many days through a foreign country, and have shown the utmost zeal in your cause.  And now, for you to be of another mind and to set yourselves against the liberties of your own city and of all Hellas would be monstrous!  The evil is not only that your resist me yourselves, but wherever I go people will be less likely to join me; they will be offended when they hear that you to whom I first came, representing a powerful city and reputed to be men of sense, did not receive me, and I shall not be able to give a satisfactory explanation, but shall have to confess either that I offer a spurious liberty, or that I am weak and incapable of protecting you against the threatened attack of the Athenians.  . . . For I am not come hither to be the tool of a faction; nor do I conceive that the liberty which I bring you is of an ambiguous character; I should forget the spirit of my country were I to enslave the many to the few, or the minority to the whole people.  Such a tyranny would be worse than the dominion of the foreigner, and we Lacedaemonians should receive no thanks in return for our trouble, but instead of honour and reputation only reproach.  We should lay ourselves open to charges far more detestable that those which are our best weapons against the Athenians, who have never been great examples of virtue.  . . . But if you plead that you cannot accept the proposal which I offer, and insist that you ought not to suffer the rejection of them because you are our friends; If you are of opinion that liberty is perilous and should not in justice be forced upon any one, but gently brought to those who are to receive it,--I shall first call the Gods and heroes of the country to witness that I have come hither for you good, and that you would not be persuaded by me: I shall then use force and ravage you country without any more scruple.  . . . On any other ground we should certainly be wrong in taking such a step; it is only for the sake of the general weal that we Lacedaemonians have any right to be forcing liberty upon those who would rather not have it.  pp. 303-304 – BC 424

124. Why the Barbarians Are Ineffectual Soldiers (Need for Discipline) – When every man is his own master in battle he will readily find a decent excuse for saving himself.  They clearly think that to frighten us at a safe distance is a better plan than to meet us hand to hand’ else why do they shout instead of fighting?  You may easily see that all the terrors with which you have invested them are in reality nothing; they do but startle the sense of sight and hearing.  If you repel their tumultuous onset, and, when opportunity offers, withdraw again in good order, keeping your ranks you will sooner arrive at place of safety, and will also learn the lesson that mobs like these, if an adversary withstand their first attack, do but threaten at a distance and make a flourish of valor, although if he yield to them they are quick enough to show their courage in following at his heels when there is no danger.  (Brasidas) p. 331 – BC 423

Book V, pages 338-407

125. Choose Freedom or Slavery – To-day you have to choose between freedom and slavery; between the name of Lacedaemonian allies, which you will deserve if you are brave, and of servants of Athens.  For even if you should be so fortunate as to escape bonds or death, servitude will be your lot, a servitude more cruel than hitherto; and what is more, you will be an impediment to the liberation of the other Hellenes. p. 344 – BC 422

126. Cleon and Brasidas Die in a Day – Brasidas was going on to the right wing when he was wounded, the Athenians did not observe his fall, and those about him carried him off the field. . . . Cleon indeed, who had never intended to remain, fled at once, and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer.  . . . Brasidas was carried safely by his followers out of the battle into the city.  He was still alive, and knew that his army had conquered, but soon afterwards he died. pp. 345-346 – BC 422

127. Both Sides Want Peace – Both alike were bent on peace.  The Athenians had been beaten at Delium, and shortly afterwards at Amphipolis; and so they had lost that confidence in their own strength which had indisposed them to treat at a time when temporary success seemed to make their final triumph certain.  . . . The Lacedaemonians on the other hand inclined to peace because the course of the war had disappointed their expectations.  There was a time when they fancied that, if they only devastated Attica, they would crush the power of Athens within a few years; and yet they had received a blow at Sphacteria such as Sparta had never experienced until then; their country was continually ravaged from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and they were always fearing lest those who had not deserted, relying on the help of those who had, should seize their opportunity and revolt, as they had done once before. . . . Upon these grounds both governments thought it desirable to make peace.  pp. 347-348 – BC 422

128. Thucydides Count of Dates – I would have a person recon the actual periods of time, and not rely upon catalogues of the archons or other official personages whose names may be used in different cities to mark the dates of past events.  For whether an event occurred in the beginning or in the middle, or whatever might be the exact point, of a magistrate’s term of office is left uncertain by such a mode of reckoning.  But if he measure by summers and winters as they are here set down, and count each summer and winter as a half year, he will find that ten summer and ten winters passed in the first part of the war. p. 353 – BC 422-421

129. Six Years of “Peace” – For six years and ten months the two powers abstained from invading each other’s territories, but abroad the cessation of arms was intermittent, and they did each other all the harm which they could.  At last they were absolutely compelled to break the treaty made at the end of the first ten years, and to declare open war.  p. 356 – BC 421

130. The War Lasts Twenty-Seven Years – Altogether the war lasted twenty-seven years, for if any one argue that the interval during which the truce continued should be excluded, he is mistaken. . . . For I well remember how, from the beginning to the end of the war, there was a common an often-repeated saying that it was to last thrice nine years.  I lived through the whole of it, and was of mature years and judgement and I took great pains to make out the exact truth.  pp. 356-357 – BC 421

131. Thucydides’ Banishment – For twenty years I was banished from my country after I held the command at Amphipolis, and associating with both sides, with the Peloponnesians quite as much as with the Athenians, because of my exile, I was thus enabled to watch quietly the course of events.  I will now proceed to narrate the quarrels which after the first ten years broke up the treaty, and the event of the war which followed.  p. 357 – BC 421

132. Meet Alcibiades - . . . the war party at Athens in their turn lost no time in pressing their views.  Foremost among them was Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, a man who would have been thought young in any other city, but was influential by reason of his high descent: he sincerely preferred the Argive alliance, but at the same time he took part against the Lacedaemonians from temper, and because his pride was touched.  p. 369 – BC 420

133. Agis Son of Archidamus is King, the Signs Unfavorable – About the same time the Lacedaemonians with their whole force, under the command of king Agis the son of Archidamus, likewise made an expedition.  They marched as far as Leuctra, a place on their own frontier in the direction of Mount Lycaeum.  No one, not even the cities whence the troops came, knew whither the expedition was going.  But at the frontier the sacrifices proved unfavorable; so they returned, and sent word to their allies that, when the coming month was over, which was Carneus, a month held sacred by the Dorians, they should prepare for an expedition.  p. 377-378 – BC 419

134. The Command of the Spartan King - . . . the king Agis, according to the law, directing their several movements.  For when the king is in the field nothing is done without him; he in person give orders to the polemarchs, which they convey to the commanders of divisions; these again to the commanders of fifties, the commanders of fifties to the commanders of enomoties, and theses to the enomoty.  In like manner any more precise instruction are passed down through the army, and quickly reach their destination.  p. 386 – BC 418

135. “All” Spartans Are Officers – for almost the whole Lacedaemonian army are officers who have officers under them, and the responsibility of executing an order devolves upon many. pp. 386-387 BC – 418

136. Spartan Numbers and Formation – However, the following calculation may give some idea of the Lacedaemonian numbers.  There were seven divisions in the field, besides the Sciritae who numbered six hundred in each division there were four pentccosties, in every pentccosty four enomoties, and of each enomoty there fought in the front rank four.  The depth of the line was not everywhere equal, but was left to the discretion of the generals commanding division; on an average it was eight deep.  The front line consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, exclusive of the Sciritae.  pp. 387 – 388 – BC

137. Spartan Marching Music – The Ladedaemonians moved slowly forward and to the music of many flute-players, who were stationed in their ranks, and played, not as an act of religion, but in order that the army might march evenly and in true measure, and that the line might not break, as often happens in great armies when they go into battle.  pp. 388-389 – BC 418

138. Each Soldier Covered by His Comrade’s Shield – All armies, when engaged, are apt to thrust outwards their right wing; and either of the opposing forces tends to outflank his enemy’s left with his own right, because every soldier individually fears for his exposed side, which he tries to cover with the shield of his comrade on the right, conceiving that the closer he draws in the better he will be protected.  p. 389 – BC 418

139. Spartans Win By Courage Alone – Then the Lacedaemonians showed in a remarkable manner that, although utterly failing in their tactics, they could win by their courage alone. p. 390 – BC 418

140. The Debate with the Melians – They spoke as follows:--

a)  Melians – An Appeal to Justice . . . your warlike movements. Which are present not only to our fears but to our eyes, seem to belie your works.  We see that, although you may reason with us, you mean to be our judges; and that at the end of the discussion, if the justice of our cause prevails and we therefore refuse to yield, we may expect war; if we are convinced by you, slavery. p. 398 – BC 416

b) Athenians –  Might Makes Right – Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine words; we will not go out of our way to prove at length that we have a right to rule, because we overthrew the Persians, or that we attack you now because we are suffering any injury at your hands.  . . . But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where the pressure of necessity is equal, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.  p. 399 – BC 416

c) Melians – Expedience and Justice – Well, then, since you set aside justice and invite us to speak of expediency, in our judgment it is certainly expedient that you should respect a principle which is for the common good; and that to every man when imperil a reasonable claim should be accounted a claim of right, and any plea which he is disposed to urge even if failing of the point a little, should help his cause.  Your interest in this principle is quite as great as our, inasmuch as you, if you fall, will incur the heaviest vengeance, and will be the most terrible example to mankind. pp. 399-400 – BC 416

d) Athenians – Who the Enemy Is – . . . for ruling states such as Lacedaemon are not cruel to their vanquished enemies.  And we are fighting not so much against the Lacedaemonians, as against our own subjects who may someday rise up and overcome their former masters.  But this is a danger which you may leave to us. p. 400 – BC 416

e) Melians – Masters and Slaves – It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves? p. 400 – BC 416

f) Athenians – Advantages, Yours and Ours – To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation.  p. 400 – BC 416

g) Back and Forth – Melians – Can’t We Be Neutral? – But must we be your enemies?  Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you? Athenians – NO! – No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness. Melians – Aren’t We Different? –  But are you subjects really unable to distinguish between states in which you have no concern, and those which are chiefly you own colonies, and in some case have revolted and been subdued by you?  p. 400 – BC 416

h) Melians – On Expedience – Will you not be making enemies of all who are now neutrals?  When they see how you are treating us they will expect you some day to turn against them; and if so, are you not strengthening the enemies whom you already have, and bringing upon you others who, if they could help, would never dream of being you enemies at all?  p. 401 – BC 416

i) Athenians – Who We Fear – We do not consider our really dangerous enemies to be any of the peoples inhabiting the mainland who, secure in their freedom, may defer indefinitely any measures of precaution which they take against us, but islanders who, like you, happen to be under no control, and all who may be already irritated by the necessity of submission to our empire—these are our real enemies, for they are the most reckless and most likely to bring themselves as well as us into a danger which they cannot but foresee.  p. 401 – BC 416

j) Melians – We Should Suffer for Freedom – Surely then if you and your subjects will brave all this risk, you to preserve your empire and they to be quite of it, how base and cowardly would it be in us, who retain our freedom, not to do and suffer anything rather than be your slaves. p. 401 – BC 416

 k) Athenians –  We Are Too Strong for You – Not so, if you calmly reflect: for you are not fighting against equals to whom you cannot yield without disgrace, but you are taking counsel whether or not you shall resist and overwhelming force.  The question is not one of honour but of prudence.  pp. 401 – 402 – BC 416

l) Melians – Fortunes of War – But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes impartial, and not always on the side of numbers.  If we yield now, all is over; but if we fight, there is yet a hope that we might stand upright. p. 402 – BC 416

m) Athenians – The Flaw of Hope – Hope is a good comforter in the hour of danger, when men have something else to depend upon, although hurtful, she is not ruinous.  But when her spendthrift nature has induced them to stake their all, they see her as she is in the moment of their fall, and not till then.  While the knowledge of her might enable them to be ware of her, she never fails.  You are weak and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. p. 402 – BC 416   

n) Melians – Faith in Gods and the Lacedaemonians – We know only too well how hard the struggle must be against you power, and against fortune, if she does not mean to be impartial.  Nevertheless we do not despair of fortune; for we hope to stand as high as you in the favor of heaven, because we are righteous, and you against whom we contend are unrighteous; and we are satisfied that our deficiency in power will be compensated by the aid of our allies the Lacedaemonians; they cannot refuse to help us, if only because we are their kinsmen, and for the sake of their own honour.  And therefore our confidence is not so utterly blind as you suppose. p. 402 – BC 416  

o) Athenians –  Gods’ Favor – As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as much of their favor as you: for we are not doing or claiming anything which goes beyond common opinion about divine or men’s desires about human things. pp. 402-403 – BC 416

p) Athenians – Self-evident Truth – For of the Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will.  p. 403 – BC 416

q) Athenians – The Failings of the Spartans – And then as to the Lacedaemonians—when you imagine that out of very shame they will assist you, we admire the simplicity of your idea, but we do not envy you the folly of it.  The Lacedaemonians are exceedingly virtuous among themselves, and according to their national standard of morality.  But, in respect of their dealing with others, although many things might be said, a word is enough to describe them,--of all men whom we know they are the most notorious for identifying what is pleasant with what is honorable, and what is expedient with what is just.  But how inconsistent is such a character with your present blind hope of deliverance! p. 403 – BC 416

r) Athenians – Justice v Expedience – But do you not see that the path of expediency is safe, whereas justice and honour involve danger in practice, and such dangers the Lacedaemonians seldom care to face? p. 403 – BC 416

s) Athenians – Path to Safety – To maintain our rights against equals, to be politic with superiors, and to be moderate towards inferiors is the path of safety. p. 405 – BC 416

t) Melians – Final Decision – Men of Athens, our resolution is unchanged; and we will not in a moment surrender that liberty which our city, founded seven hundred years ago, still enjoys; we will trust in the good-fortune which, by the favor of the Gods, has hitherto preserved us, and for human help to the Lacedaemonians, and endeavor to save ourselves.  p. 405 – BC 416

u) Athenians – Response – Well, we must say, judging from the decision at which you have arrived, that you are the only men who deem the future to be more certain than the present, and regard things unseen as already realized in your fond anticipation, and that the more you cast yourselves upon the Lacedaemonians and fortune, and hope, and trust them, the more complete will be our ruin. pp. 405-406 – BC 416

141. Fall and Destruction of Melos – The place was now closely invested, and there was treachery among the citizens themselves.  So the Melians were induced to surrender at discretion.  The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age, and made slaves of the women and children.  They then colonized the island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own.  p. 407 – BC 416

Book VI, pages 408-484

142. Reasons for War – They the Athenians were determined to make war.  They virtuously professed that they were going to assist their own kinsmen and their newly-acquired allies, but the simple truth was that they aspired to the empire of Sicily. p. 412 – BC 416

143. Nicias Against the War – Nicias, who had been appointed general against his will, thought that the people had come to a wrong conclusion, and that upon slight and flimsy ground they were aspiring to the conquest of Sicily, which was no easy task. p. 414 – BC 415

144. Nicias on Self Interest - . . . not that I think the worse of a citizen who takes a little thought about his life or his property, for I believe that the sense of a man’s own interest will quicken his interest in the prosperity of the state.  p. 414 – BC 415

145. Nicias Speaks His Mind – But I have never been induced by the love of reputation to say a single word contrary to what I thought; neither will I now: I will say simply what I believe to be best.  If I told you to take care of what you have and not to throw away present advantage in order to gain an uncertain and distant good, my words would be powerless against a temper like yours.  I would rather argue that this is not the time, and that your great aims will not be easily realized. 

146. Nicias Counsels against Spending Money on Foreign Wars – It is our duty to expend our new resources upon ourselves at home, and not upon begging exiles who have an interest in successful lies; who find it expedient only to contribute words, and let others fight their battles; and who, if saved, prove ungrateful; if they fail, as they very likely may, only involve their friends in a common ruin.  p. 417 – BC 415 

147. Nicias Rips Alcibiades – I dare say there may be some young man here who is delighted at holding a command, and the more so because he is too young for his post; and he, regarding only his own interest, may recommend you to sail; he may be one who is much admired for his stud of horses and wants to make something out of his command which will maintain him in his extravagance.  But do not you give him the opportunity of indulging his own magnificent tastes at the expense of the state. p. 417 – BC 415

148. Nicias on Bad Allies – Let us have no more allies such as ours have too often been, whom we are expected to assist when they are in misfortune, but to whom we ourselves when in need may look in vain.  P. 418 – BC 415

149. Nicias on the Duty of a Good Magistrate – The first duty of a good magistrate is to do the very best which he can for his country, or, at least, to do her no harm which he can avoid.  p. 418 – BC 415

150. Those against Alcibiades Damage the State – They thought that he was aiming at a tyranny and set themselves against him.  And therefore, although his talents as a military commander were unrivalled, they entrusted the administration of the war to others, because they personally objected to his private life, and so they speedily shipwrecked the state.  p. 419 – BC 415

151. Alcibiades Brag – I sent into the lists [at the Olympic Games] seven chariots,--no other private man ever did the like; I was victor, and also won the second and fourth prize; and I ordered everything in a style worthy of my victory. p. 419 – BC 415

152. The Athenian’s Mistake in Driving out Alcibiades (Repeat of 150) – They thought that he was aiming at a tyranny and set themselves against him.  And therefore, although his talents as a military commander were unrivalled, they entrusted the administration of the war to others, because they personally objected to his private life, and so they speedily shipwrecked the state. p. 419 – BC 415

153. Alcibiades’s Olympic Triumph (Repeat of 151) – I sent into the lists seven chariots,--no other private man ever did the like; I was victor, and also won the second and fourth prize; and I ordered everything in a style worthy of my victory.  p. 419 – BC 415

154. Alcibiades Benefits the State at His Own Expense and Exalts in His “Superiority” (Think Trump) – There is some use in the folly of a man who at his own cost benefits not only himself, but the state.  And where is the injustice, if I or anyone who feels his own superiority to another refuses to be on a level with him? p. 420 – BC 415

155. Alcibiades Disparages the Mixed-Multitude of Sicily (Think Hitler) – For although the Sicilian cities are populous, their inhabitants are a mixed multitude, and they readily give up old forms of government and receive new ones from without.  No one really feels that he has a city of his own; and so the individual is ill-provided with arms, and the country has no regular means of defense. . . They are a motley crew, who are never of one mind in counsel, and are incapable of any concert in action.  Every man is for himself, and will readily come over to any one who makes an attractive offer; the more readily if, as report says, they are in a state of revolution.  p. 421 – BC 415

156. Must Fulfill Alliances to Grow the Empire – We have sworn to them, and have no right to argue that they never assisted us.  In seeking their alliance we did not intend that they should come and help us here, but that they should harass our enemies in Sicily, and prevent them from coming hither.  Like all other imperial powers, we have acquired our dominion by our readiness to assist any one, whether Barbarian or Hellene, who may have invoked our aid. p. 422 – BC 415

157. Goal of the War – To Humble the Spartans – We shall humble the pride of the Peloponnesians when they see that, scorning the delights of repose, we have attacked Sicily.  By the help of acquisitions there, we shall probably become masters of all Hellas . . . p. 422 – BC 415

158. A Description of the Athenian Force at Departure – No armament so magnificent or costly had ever been sent out by any single Hellenic power . . . p. 429 – BC 415

159. The Arrest of Alcibiades Ordered after a Prejudiced Investigation – There they [the Athenian Fleet] found that the vessel Salaminia had come from Athens to fetch Alcibiades, who had been put upon his trial by the state and was ordered home to defend himself.  With him were summoned certain of his soldiers, who were accused, some of profaning the mysteries, others of mutilation of the Hermae.  For after the departure of the expedition the Athenians prosecuted both enquiries as keenly as ever.  They did not investigate the character of the informers, but in their suspicious mood listened to all manner of statements, and seized and imprisoned some of the most respectable citizens of the evidence of wretches; they thought it better to sift the matter and discover the truth; and they would not allow even a man of good character against whom an accusation was brought to escape without a thorough investigation, merely because the informer was a rogue.  For the people, who had heard by tradition that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons ended in great oppression, and knew moreover that their power was overthrown, not by Harmodius or any efforts of their own, but by the Lacedaemonians, were in a state of incessant fear and suspicion.  pp. 445-446 – BC 415

160. A Historian Looks Back – the Murder of Hippias’ Brother and His  Revenge – They [Aristogiton and Harmodius] found Hipparchus [Hippias’ brother] near the Leocorium, as it was called, and then and there falling upon him with all the blind fury, one of an injured lover, the other of a man smarting under an insult, they smote an slew him.  The crowd ran together, and so Aristogiton for the present escaped the guards; but he was afterwards taken and not very gently handled.  Harmodius perished on the spot.  . . . Such was the conspiracy of Harmodiius and Aristogiton, which began in the resentment of a lover, the reckless attempt which followed arose out of a sudden fright.  To the people at large the tyranny simply became more oppressive, and Hippias, after his brother’s death living in great fear, slew many of the citizens; he also began to look abroad in hope of securing an asylum should a revolution occur. pp. 449-450 – BC 514   

161. “False” Witness Granted Immunity – At last one of the prisoners, who was believed to be deeply implicated [in the mutilation of the Hermae and the mockery of the mysteries], was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a confession-whether true or false I cannot say; opinions are divided, and no one knew at the time, or to this day knows, who the offenders were.  His companion argued that even if he were not guilty he ought to confess and claim a pardon; he would thus save his own life, and at the same time deliver Athens from the prevailing state of suspicion.  His chance of escaping would be better if he confessed his guilt in the hope of a pardon, than if he denied it and stood his trial.  So he gave evidence both against himself and others in the matter of the Hermae.  The Athenians were delighted at finding out what they supposed to be the truth; they had been is despair at the thought that the conspirators against the democracy would never be known, and they immediately liberated the informer and all whom he had not denounced.  The accused they brought to trial, and executed such of them as could be found.  Those who had fled they condemned to death, and promised a reward to any one who would kill them.  No one could say if the sufferers were justly punished, but the beneficial effect on the city at the time was undeniable. pp. 450-451 – BC 415

162. Alcibiades Condemned, Switched Sides – From every quarter suspicion had gathered around Alcibiades, and the Athenian people were determined to have him tried and executed; so they sent the ship Salaminia to Sicily bearing a summons to him and to others against whom information had been given.  He was ordered to follow the officers home and defend himself, but they were told not to arrest him . . .  Alcibiades, now in exile, crossed not long afterwards in a small vessel from Thurii to Peloponnesus, and the Athenians on his non-appearance sentenced him and his companions to death.  p. 452 – BC 415   

163. Value of Skill – For they [the Syracusans] showed no want of spirit or daring in this or any other engagement; in courage they were not a whit inferior to their enemies, had their skill only been adequate, but when it failed, they could no longer do justice to their good intentions. P. 457 – BC 415

164. Want of Discipline Could Be Overcome – He [Hermocrates] told them [the Syracusans] not to be disheartened at the result of the battle; for their resolution had not been defeated, but they had suffered from want of discipline.  Yet they had proved less unequal than might have been expected; and they should remember that they had been contending against the most experienced soldiers of Hellas; they were unskilled workmen, and the Athenians masters in their craft . . . if they had a few experienced generals, and during the winter got their hoplites into order, providing arms for those who had none, and so raising the number of their forces to the utmost, while at the same time they insisted on strict drill and discipline, they would have a good chance of victory; for they had courage already, and only wanted steadiness inaction. p. 459 – BC 415

164. Athenian Empire Established out of Victory over Persia, not the Liberation of the Hellenes – The Ionians and other colonists of theirs who were their allies, wanting to be revenged on the Persian, freely invited them to be their leaders; and they accepted the invitation.  But soon they charged them, some with desertion, and some with making war upon each other; any plausible accusation which they could bring against any of them became and excuse of their overthrow.  It was not for the liberties of Hellas that Athens, or for her own liberty that Hellas, fought against the Persians; they fought, the Athenians that they might enslave Hellas to themselves instead of him, the rest of the Hellenes that they might get a new master, who may be cleverer, but certainly makes a more dishonest use of his wits.  p. 462 – BC 415

165. Expedience – Now to a tyrant or to an imperial city nothing is inconsistent which is expedient, and no man is a kinsman who cannot be trusted.  p. 467 – BC 415

166. Alcibiades Speaks to the Spartans:

a) The Follies of Democracy – Any power adverse to despotism is called democracy, and my family have always retained the leadership of the people in their hands because we have been the persistent enemies of tyrants.  Living too under a popular government, how could we avoid in a great degree conforming to circumstances?  However, we did our best to observe political moderation amid the prevailing license.  But there were demagogues, as there always have been, who led the people into evil ways, and it was they who drove me out. . .  The follies of democracy are universally admitted, and there is nothing new to be said about them.  pp. 472-473 – BC 415

b) War Plan – We sailed to Sicily hoping in the first place to conquer the Sisilian cities; then to proceed against the Hellenes of Italy; and  lastly, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian dominions, and on Carthage itself.  If all or most of these enterprises succeeded, we meant finally to attack Peloponnesus, bringing with us the whole Hellenic power which we had gained abroad, besides many barbarians whom we intended to hire—Iberians and the neighboring tribes, esteemed to be most warlike barbarians that now are.  Of the timber which Italy supplies in such abundance we meant to build numerous additional triremes, and with them to blockade Peloponnesus.  At the same time making inroads by land with our infantry, we should have stormed some of your cities and invested others,  Thus we hoped to crush you easily, and to rule over the Hellenic world.  For the better accomplishment of our various aims our newly-acquired territory would supply money and provisions enough, apart from the revenue which we receive in Hellas.  p. 473 – BC 415

c) Advice to the Spartans 1. You must send to Sicily a force of hoplites who will themselves handle the oars and will take the field immediately on landing.  2. A Spartan commander I conceive to be even more indispensable that an army; his duty will be to organize the troops which are already enlisted, and to press the unwilling into the service.  Thus you will inspire confidences in your friends and overcome the fears of eh wavering.  3) Here too, in Hellas you should make open war. The Syracusans, seeing that you have not forgotten them, will then persevere in their resistance, while the Athenians will have greater difficulty in reinforcing their army.  4) You ought above all to fortify Deccelea in Attica; the Athenians are always in dread of this; to them it seems to be the only calamity which they have not already experienced to the utmost in the course of the war. . . . I will sum up briefly the chief though by no means all the advantages which you will gain, and the disadvantages which you will inflict, by the fortification of Decclea.  The whole stock of the country will fall into your hands.  The slaves will come over to you of their own accord; what there is besides will be seized by you.  The Athenians will at once be deprived of the revenues which they obtain from silver mines of Laurium, and of all the profits which they make by the land or by the law courts, above all, the customary tribute will fail; for their allies, when they see that you are now carrying on the war in earnest, will not mind them. pp. 474-475 – BC 415

d) True Enemies of Athens – The true enemies of my country are not those who, like you, have injured her in open war, but those who have compelled her friends to become her enemies.  I love Athens, not in so far as I am wronged by her, but in so far as I once enjoyed the privileges of a citizen.   The country which I am attacking is no longer mine, but a lost country which I am seeking to regain.  p. 475 – BC 415

e) The Definition of a True Patriot – He is the true patriot, not who, when unjustly exiled, abstains from attacking his country, but who in the warmth of his affection seeks to recover her without regard to the means.  p. 475 – BC 415

f) What Alcibiades Has to Offer – I desire therefore that you, Lacedaemonians, will use me without scruple in any service however difficult or dangerous, remembering that, according to the familiar saying, “the more harm I did you as an enemy, the more good can I do you as a friend.”  For I know the secrets of the Athenians, while I could only guess at yours. p. 475 – BC 415

Book VII, pages 485-549

167. Nicas Letter Complains of Difficulty of Leading in a Democracy – Moreover I know your dispositions; you like to hear pleasant things, but afterwards lay the fault on those who tell you them if they are falsified by the event; therefore I think it safer to speak the truth.  p. 493 – BC 414

165. Supply Line Cut – Many perished and many prisoners were made at the capture of the forts, and abundant spoil of different kinds was taken . . . The loss of Plemmyrium was one of the greatest and severest blows which befell the Athenians.  For now they could no longer even introduce provision with safety, but the Syracusan ships lay watching to prevent them and they had to fight for passage.  General discouragement and dismay prevailed throughout the army. p. 500 – BC 413

166. The Burden of Two Wars – But worse than all was the cruel necessity of maintaining two wars at once, and they carried on both with a determination which no one would have believed unless he had actually seen it. p. 503 – BC 413

167. Slaughter and Murder by the Thracins: the Worst – The Thracians dashed into the town, sacked the houses and temples, and slaughtered the inhabitants.  They spared neither old nor young, but cut down, one after another, all whom they met, the women and children, the very beasts of burden, and every living thing which they saw.  For the Thracians, when they dare, can be as bloody as the worst barbarians.  There in Mycalessus the wildest panic ensued, and destruction in every form was rife. They even fell upon a boy’s school, the largest in the place, which the children had just entered, and massacred them every one.  No greater calamity than this ever affected a whole city; never was anything so sudden or so terrible. . . . Such was the fate of Mycalessus; considering the size of the city, no calamity more deplorable occurred during the war.  pp. 504-505 – BC 413

168. What Is a Winner? – For the Corinthians considered themselves conquerors, if they were not severely defeated; but the Athenians thought that they were defeated because they had no gained a signal victory. pp. 508-509

169. Technology and Tactics – Profiting by the experience which they had acquired in the last sea fight, they [Syracussans] devised several improvement in the construct of their vessels.  The cut down and strengthened the prows, and also made the beams which projected from them thicker; these latter they supported underneath with stays of timber extending from the beams through the sides of the ship a length of nine feet within and nine without, after the fashion in which the Corinthians had refitted their prows before they fought with the squadron from Naupactus.  For the Syracusans hoped thus to gain an advantage over the Athenian ships, which were not constructed to resist their improvement, but had their prow slender. Because they were in the habit of rowing round and enemy and striking the side of his vessel instead of meeting him prow to prow.  The plan would be the more effectual, because they were going to fight in the Great Harbors, where many ships would be crowded in a narrow space.  They would charge full in face, and presenting their own massive and solid beaks would stave in the hollow and weak forepart of their enemies’ ships; while the Athenians, confronted as they were, would not be able to wheel round them or break their line before striking, to which maneuvers they mainly trusted—the want of room would make the one impossible, and the Syracusans themselves would do their best to prevent the other.  What had hitherto been considered a defect of skill on the part of their pilots, the practice of striking beak to beak, would now be a great advantage, to which they would have constant recourse; for the Athenians, when forced to back water, could only retire towards the land, which was too near, and of which but a small part, that is to say, their own encampment, was open to them.  The Syracusans would be masters of the rest of the harbor, and, if the Athenians were hard pressed at any point, they would all be driven together into one small spot, where they would run foul of one another and fall into confusion.  (which proved to be the case, for nothing was more disastrous to the Athenians in all these sea-fights than the impossibility of retreating, as the Syracusans could, to any part of the harbor.) pp. 509-510 – BC 413

170. Nicias’ Failures – For Nicias was dreaded at his first arrival, but when instead of at once laying siege to Syracuse, he passed the winter at Catana, he fell into contempt, and his delay gave Gylippus time to come with an army from Peloponnesus.  Whereas if he had struck hard at first, the Syracusans would never even have thought of getting fresh troops; strong in their own self-sufficiency, they would have recognized their inferiority only when the city had been actually invested, and then, if they had sent for reinforcements, they would have found them useless. p. 514 – BC 413

171. Demosthenes Wanted to Leave – Demosthenes gave his voice against remaining; he said that the decisive attack upon Epipolae had failed, and, in accordance with his original intention, he should vote for immediate departure, while the voyage was possible, and while with the help of the ships which had recently joined them they had the upper hand at any rate by sea.  It was more expedient for the city that they should make war upon the Peloponnesians, who were raising a fort in Attica, then against the Syracusans, whom they could now scarcely hope to conquer; and there was no sense in carrying on the siege at a vast expense and with no result.  This was the opinion of Demosthenes. p. 518 – BC 413

172. Nicias Falters – Nicias in his own mind took the same gloomy view of their affairs; but he did not wish openly to confess their weakness, or by a public vote given in a numerous assembly to let their intention reach the enemy’s ears, and so to lose the advantage of departing secretly whenever they might choose to go. p. 518 – BC 413

173. Political Considerations = Evil – But in addressing the council he positively refused to withdraw the army; he [Nicias] knew, he said, that the Athenian people would not forgive their departure if they left without an order from home.  The men upon whose votes their fate would depend would not, like themselves, have seen with their own eyes the state of affairs; they would be convinced by any accusation which a clever speaker might bring forward.  Indeed many or most of the very soldiers who were now crying out that their case was desperate would raise the opposite cry when they reached home, and would say that the generals were traitors, and had been bribed to depart; and therefore he, knowing the tempers of the Athenians, would for his own part rather take his chance and fall, if he must, alone by the hands of the enemy, than die unjustly on a dishonorable charge at the hands of the Athenians. p. 519 – BC 413

174. Eclipse of the Moon – False Omen or False Interpretation – Even Nicias now no longer objected, but only made the condition that there should be no open voting.  So, maintaining such secrecy as they could, they gave orders for the departure of the expedition; the men were to prepare themselves against a given signal.  The preparations were made and they were on the point of sailing, when the moon, being just then at the full, was eclipsed.  The mass of the army was greatly moved, and called upon the generals to remain.  Nicias himself, who was too much under the influence of divination and omens, refused even to discuss the question of their removal until they had remained thrice nine days, as the soothsayers prescribed.  This was the reason why the departure of the Athenians was finally delayed.  p. 521 – BC 413

175. Athenian Defeat at Sea – The Athenians on their side put out with eight-six ships; and the two fleets met and fought, Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, hoping to surround the enemy, extended his line too far towards the land, and was defeated by the Syracusans, who, after overcoming the Athenian center, shut him up in the inner bay of the harbor.  There he was slain, and the vessels which were under his command and had followed him were destroyed.  The Syracusans now pursued and began to drive ashore the rest of the Athenian fleet.  p. 522 – BC 413

176. Syracusans Murder Prisoners of War – Most of the Athenian ships were saved and brought back to the Athenian station.  Still the Syracusans and their allies took eighteen, and killed the whole of their crews. p. 523 – BC 413

177. Defeat at Sea – the Final Straw – They had failed at almost every point, and were already in great straits, when the defeat at sea, which they could not have thought possible, reduced their fortunes to a still lower ebb. p. 523 – BC 413

178. Syracusans Close the Harbor – The Syracusans at once sailed round the shore of the harbor without fear, and determined to close the mouth, that the Athenians might not be able, even if they wanted, to sail out by stealth. . . . if they could conquer the Athenians and their allies by sea and land, their success would be glorious in the eyes of all the Hellenes, who would at once be set free, some from slavery, others from fear. p. 524 – BC 413

179. Nicias Final Call to Action – Remember the sudden turns of war; let your hope be that fortune herself may yet come over to us; and prepare to retrieve your defeat in a manner worthy of the greatness of your own army which you see before you . . .  Let me appeal once more to you who are Athenians, and remind you that there are no more ships like these in the dockyards of the Piraeus, and that you have no more recruits fit for service.  In any event but victory you enemies here will instantly sail against Athens, while our countrymen at home, who are but a remnant, will be unable to defend themselves against the attacks of their former foes reinforced by the new invaders.  You who are in Sicily will instantly fall into the hands of the Syracusans (and you know how you meant to deal with them), and your friends at Athens into the hands of the Lacedaemonians.  In this one struggle you have to fight for yourselves and them.  pp. 529 – 531 – BC 413

180. Gylippus’ Call for Vengeance – Against such disorder, and against hateful enemies whose good-fortune has run away from them to us, let us advance with fury.  We should remember in the first place that men are doing a most lawful act when they take vengeance upon an enemy and an aggressor, and that they have a right to satiate their heart’s animosity; secondly, that this vengeance, which is proverbially the sweetest of all things, will soon be with our grasp . . . let no one’s heart be softened towards them. p. 533 – BC 413

181. Motivation in Battle – On the Athenian side they were shouting to their men that they must force a passage and seize the opportunity now or never of returning in safety to their native land.  To the Syracusans and their allies was represented the glory of preventing the escape of their enemies, and of a victory by which every man would exalt the honour of his own city. p. 536 – BC 413

182. The Armies Watch the Sea Battle from the Shore – While the naval engagement hung in the balance the two armies on shore had great trial and conflict of soul.  The Sicilian soldier was animated by the hope of increasing the glory which he had already won, while the invader was tormented by the fear that his fortunes might sink lower still.  The last chance of the Athenians lay in their ships, and their anxiety was dreadful.  The fortune of the battle varied; and it was not possible that the spectators on the shore should all receive the same impression of it.  Being quite close and having different points of view, they would some of them see their own ships victorious; their courage would then revive, and they would earnestly call upon the Gods not to take from them their hope of deliverance.  But others, who say their ships worsted, cried and shrieked aloud, and were by the sight alone more utterly unnerved than the defeated combatants themselves.  Others again, who had fixed their gaze on some part of the struggle which was undecided, were in a state of excitement still more terrible; they kept swaying their bodies to and fro in an agony of hope and fear as the stubborn conflict went on and on; for at every instant they were all but saved or all but lost.  p. 536 – BC 413

183. The Retreat Begins – And the land-forces, no longer now divided in feeling, but uttering one universal groan of intolerable anguish, ran, some of them to save the ships, others to defend what remained of the wall; but the greater number began to look to themselves and to their own safety.  Never had there been a great panic in an Athenian army than at that moment.  p. 537 – BC 413

184. The Retreat – On the third day after the sea-fight, when Nicias and Demosthenes thought that their preparations were complete, the army began to move.  They were in a dreadful condition; not only was there the great fact that they had lost their whole fleet, and instead of their expected triumph had brought the utmost peril upon Athens as well as upon themselves, but also the sights which presented themselves as they quitted the camp were painful to every eye and mind.  The dead were unburied, and when any one saw the body of a friend lying on the ground he was smitten with sorrow and dread, while the sick or wounded who still survived but had to be left were even a greater trial to the living, and more to be pitied than those who were gone.  Their prayers and lamentations drove their companions to distraction; they would beg that they might be taken with them, and call by name any fried or relation whom they saw passing; they would hang upon their departing comrades and follow as far as they could, and when their limbs and strength failed them and they dropped behind many were the imprecations and cries which they uttered.  So that the whole army was in tears, and such was their despair that they could hardly make up their minds to stir, although they were leaving an enemy’s country, having suffered calamities too great for tears already, and dreading miseries yet greater in the unknown future. pp. 539-540 – BC 413

185. Men Constitute the State – For men, and not walls or ships in which are no men, constitute a state. (Nicas) p. 542 – BC 413

186. Disaster at the River Crossing – The Athenians hurried on to the rive Assinarus.  They hoped to gain a little relief if they forded the river, for the mass of horsemen and other troops overwhelmed and crushed them; and they were worn out by fatigue and thirst.  But no sooner did they reach the water than they lost all order and rushed in; every man was trying to cross first, and, the enemy pressing upon them at the same time, the passage of the river became hopeless.  Being compelled to keep close together they fell on upon another, and trampled each other underfoot: some at once perished, pierced by their own spears; others got entangled in the baggage and were carried down the stream.  . . . Where upon the water at once became foul, but was drunk all the same, although muddy and dyed with blood, and the crowd fought for it.  At last, when the dead bodies were lying in heaps upon one on other in the water and the army was utterly undone, some perishing in the river, and any who escaped being cut off by the cavalry . . . p.  547 – BC 413

187. Captives Placed in the Quarries – The captive Athenians and allies they deposited in the quarries, which they thought would be the safest place of confinement. p. 548 – BC 413

188. Death of Nicias and Demosthenes – Nicias and Demosthenes they put to the sword, although against the will of Gylippus. p. 548 – BC 413

189. Suffering in the Quarries – Those who were imprisoned in the quarries were at the beginning of the captivity harshly treated by the Syracusans.  They were great numbers of them, and they were crowded in a deep and narrow place.  At first the sun by day was still scorching and suffocating, for they had no roof over their heads, while the autumn nights were cold, and the extremes of temperature engendered violent disorders.  Being cramped for room they had to do everything on the same spot.  The corpses of those who died from their wounds, exposure to the weather, and the like, lay heaped one upon another.  The smells were intolerable; and they were at the same time affected by hunger and thirst.  During eight month they were allowed only about half a pint of water and a pint of food a day.  Every kind of misery which could befall man in such a place befell them.  This was the condition of all the captives for about ten weeks.  At length the Syracusans sold them, with the exception of the Athenians and of any Sicilian or Italian Greeks who had sided with them in the war.  The whole number of the public prisoners is not accurately known, but there were not less than seven thousand.  p. 549 – BC 413

190. “Greatest” War – Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or indeed of all Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest—the most glorious to be victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished; for they were utterly and at all point defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious.  Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth, nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home.  Thus ended the Sicilian expedition.  p. 549 – BC 413

Book VIII, pages 550-626

191.  Blame Others – Forget Their Own Vote – The news was brought to Athens, but the Athenians could not believe that the armament had been so completely annihilated, although they had the positive assurances of the very soldiers who had escaped from the scene of action.  At last they knew the truth; and then they were furious with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition—as if they had not voted it themselves—and with the soothsayers, and prophets, and all who by the influence of religion had at the time inspired them with the belief that they could conquer Sicily. p. 550 – BC 413   

192. Implication of the Loss – The citizens mourned and the city mourned; they had lost a host of cavalry and hoplites and the flower of their youth, and there were none to replace them.  And when they saw an insufficient number of ships in their docks, and no crews to man them, nor money in the treasury, they despaired of deliverance. p. 550 – BC 413

193. Will Not Give Way – Still they determined under any circumstances not to give way.  They would procure timber and money by whatever means they might, and build a navy. pp. 550-551 – BC 413 

194. When Democracy Works – After the manner of a democracy, they were very amenable to discipline while their fright lasted. p. 551 – BC 413  

195. Tissaphernes Appointed to Bring Persian Support - . . . they were accompanied by an envoy from Tissaphernes, whom King Darius the son of Artaxerxes had appointed to be governor of the provinces on the coast of Asia.  Tissaphernes too was inviting the assistance of the Lacedaemonians, and promised to maintain their troops, for the King had quite lately been demanding of him the revenues due from the Hellenic cities in his province, which he had been prevented by the Athenians from collecting, and therefore still owed. p. 553 – BC 413 

196. Lacedaemonian Alliance with the King of Persia – Immediately after the revolt of Miletus the Lacedaemonians made their first alliance with the King of Persia, which was negotiated by Tissaphernes and Chalcideu.  It ran as follows: -- The Lacedaemonians and their allies make an alliance with the King and Tissaphernes on the following terms:-- I. All the territory and all the cities which are in possession of the King, or were in possession of his forefathers, shall be the King’s, and whatever revenue or other advantages the Athenians derived from these cities, the King, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, shall combine to prevent them from receiving such revenue or advantage.  II. The King, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, shall carry on the war against the Athenians in common, and they shall not make peace with the Athenians unless both parties—the King on the one hand and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on the other—agree.  III. Whosoever revolts from the King shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and whosoever revolts from the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall be the enemy of the King in like manner.  Such were the terms of the alliance. p. 561 – BC 412

197. Retreat Better than Defeat – There was no dishonor in Athenians retreating before an enemy’s fleet when circumstances required.  But there would be the deepest dishonor under any circumstances or in a defeat. And the city would then not only incur disgrace, but would be in the utmost danger.  p. 567 – BC 412

198. Persia Pays – During the following winter, Tissaphernes, after he had put a garrison in Iasus, came to Miletus.  There he distributed one month’s pay among all the ships, at the rate of an Attic drachma a day per man, as his envoy had promised at Lacedaemon, in future he proposed to give half a drachma only until he had asked the King’s leave, promising that if he obtained it he would pay the entire drachma. p. 569 – BC 412

199. New Treaty between Persia and Sparta – The Lacedaemonians and their allies make agreement with King Darius and the sons of the King, and with Tissaphernes, that there shall be alliance and friendship between them on the following conditions.--  I. Whatever territory and cities belong to King Darius, or formerly belonged to his father, or to his ancestors, against these neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies shall make war, or do them any hurt, nor shall the Lacedaemonians or their allies exact tribute of them.  Neither Darius the King nor the subjects of the King shall make war upon the Lacedaemonians or their allies, or do them any hurt.  II. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies have need of anything from the King, or the King have need of anything from the Lacedaemonians and their allies whatever they do by mutual agreement shall hold good.  III. They shall carry on the war against the Athenians and their allies in common, and if they make peace, shall make peace in common.  IV. The King shall defray the expense of any number of troops for which the King has sent, so long as they remain in the King’s country.  V. If any of the cities who are parties to this treaty go against the King’s country, the rest shall interfere and aid the King to the utmost of their power.  And if any of the inhabitants of the King’s country or any country under the dominion of the King shall go against the country of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall interfere and aid them to the utmost of his power.   p. 573 – BC 412

200. Alcibiades Changes Sides Again – After the death of Chalcideus and the engagement at Miletus, Alcibiades fell under suspicion at Sparta, and orders came from him to Astyochus that he should be put to death.  For he was hated by Agis, and generally distrusted.  In fear he retired to Tissaphernes, and soon, by working upon him, did all he could to injure the Peloponnesian cause. p. 578 – BC 412

201. The Advice of Alcibiades to “Play” the Greeks Against Each Other – Alcibiades also advised Tissaphernes not to be in a hurry about putting an end to the war, and neither to bring up the Phoenician fleet which he was preparing, nor to give pay to more Hellenic sailors; he should not be so anxious to put the whole power both by sea and land into the same hands.  Let the dominion only remain divided, and then, whichever of the two rivals was troublesome, the King might always use the other against him . . . Tissaphernes was strongly inclined, if we may judge from his acts.  For he gave his full confidence to Alcibiades, whose advice he approved, and kept the Peloponnesians ill-provided, at the same time refusing to let them fight at sea, and insisting that they must wait until the Phoenician ships arrived; they would then fight at an advantage.  In this manner he ruined their affairs and impaired the efficiency of their navy, which had once been in first-rate condition.  There were many other ways in which he showed openly and unmistakably that he was not in earnest in the cause of his allies. p. 580 – BC 412

202. Alcibiades Real Motivation – In giving this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, now that he had passed over to them, Alcibiades said what he really thought to be most for their interests.  But he had another motive; he was preparing the way for his own return from exile. He knew that, if he did not destroy his country altogether, the time would come when he would persuade his countrymen to recall him; and he thought that his arguments would be most effectual if he were seen to be on intimate terms with Tissaphernes.  And the result proved that he was right.  The Athenian soldiers at Samos soon perceived that he had great influence with him, and he sent messages to the chief persons among them, whom he begged to remember him to all good men and true, and to let them know that he would be glad to return to his country and cast in his lot with them.  He would at the same time make Tissaphernes their friend, but they must establish an oligarchy, and abolish the villainous democracy which had driven him out. pp. 580-581 – BC 412

203. The Attack against Alcibiades – There was great opposition to any change in the democracy, and he enemies of Alcibiades were loud in protesting that it would be a dreadful thing if he were permitted to return in defiance of the law.  The Eumolpidae and Ceryces called heaven and earth to witness that the city must never restore a man who had been banished for profaning the mysteries.  p. 585 BC 412 BC – 412

204. Peisander on Ending the Democracy and Brining Back Alcibiades – Peisander came forward . . . he asked them whether there was the least hope of saving the country unless the King could be won over.  They all acknowledged that there was none.  He then said to them plainly—But this alliance is impossible unless we are governed in a wiser manner, and office is confined to a smaller number then the king will trust us.  Do not let use dwelling on the form of the constitution, which we may hereafter change as we please, when the very existence of Athens is at stake.  And we must restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living capable of saving us. p. 585 BC – 412

205. Third Treaty with the Persians – In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius and King . . . I. All the King’s country which is in Asia shall continue to be the King’s and the King shall act as he pleases in respect of his own country.  II. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not go against the Kings country to do hurt, and the King shall not go against the country of the Lacedaemonians and their allies to do hurt . . . III.  Tissaphernes shall provide food for the number of ships which the Lacedaemonians have at present . . . the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall at the end of the war repay to Tissaphernes the money which they have received.  When the King’s ships have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and of their allies and of the King shall carry on the war in common, as may seem best to Tissaphernes and to the Lacedaemonians and their allies: and if they wish to make peace with the Athenians both parties shall make peace on the same terms. pp. 588-589 – BC 412

206. Coup by the Oligarchs – There they found the revolution more than half accomplished by the oligarchical clubs.  Some of the younger citizens had conspired and secretly assassinated one Androcles, a great man with the people, who had been foremost in procuring the banishment of Alcibiades.  Their motives were two-fold: they killed him because he was a demagogue; but more because they hoped to gratify Alcibiades, whom they were still expecting to return, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. p. 592 – BC 411

207. Constitutional Convention – The New Government – First, they called an assembly and proposed the election of ten commissioners, who should be empowered to frame for the city the best constitution which they could devise; this was to be laid before the people on a fixed day.  When the day arrived they summoned an assembly to meet in the temple of Poseidon at Colonus without the walls and distant rather more than a mile.  But the commissioners only moved that any Athenian should be allowed to propose whatever resolution he please—nothing more; threatening at the same time with severe penalties anybody who indicted the proposer for unconstitutional action, or otherwise offered injury to him  The whole scheme now came to light,  A motion was made to abolish all the existing magistracies and the payment of magistrates, and to choose a presiding board of five; these five were to choose a hundred, and each of the hundred was to co-opt three other.  The Four Hundred thus selected were to meet in the council-chamber; they were to have absolute authority, and might govern as they deemed best; the Five Thousand were to be summoned by them whenever they chose. p. 594 – BC 411

208. The Destruction of Athenian “Freedom” – No wonder then that, in the hands of all these able men, the attempt, however arduous, succeeded.  For an easy thing it certainly was not, one hundred years after the fall of the tyrants, to destroy the liberties of the Athenians, who not only were a free, but during more than one half of this time had been and imperial people.  The assembly passed all these measures without dissentient voice, and was then dissolved . . . Having disposed their forces the Four Hundred arrived, every one with a dagger concealed about his person, and with them a hundred and twenty Hellenic youth, whose service they used for any act of violence which they had in hand.  They broke in upon the council of five hundred as they sat in the council-chamber, and told them to take their pay and be gone . . . Soon however they wholly changed the democratic system; and although they did not recall the exiles, because Alcibiades was one of the. They governed the city with a high hand.  Some few whom they thought would be better out of the way were put to death by them, other imprisoned, others again exiled. pp. 595-596 – BC 411

209. Lies and Civil War – Chaereas, seeing in an instant how matters stood, had contrived to steal away and get back to Samos, where he told the soldiers with much aggravation the news from Athens, how they were punishing everybody with stripes, and how no one might speak a word against the government; he declared that their wives and children were being outraged, and that the oligarchy were going to take the relations of all the men serving at Samos who were not of their faction and shut them up, intending , if the fleet did not submit, to put them to death.  And he added a great many other falsehoods . . . When the army heard his report they instantly rushed upon the chief authors of the oligarchy who were present and their confederates, and tried to stone them.  But they were deterred by the warnings of the moderate party, and begged them not to ruin everything by violence with the enemy were lying close to them, prow threatening prow.  Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, who were the chief leaders of the reaction, now thought that the time had come for the open proclamation of democracy at Samos, and they bound the soldiers, more especially those of the oligarchical party, but the most solemn oaths to maintain a democracy and be of one mind, to prosecute vigorously the war with Peloponnesus, to be enemies to the Four Hundred and to hold no parley with them by heralds.  pp. 599-600 – BC 411

210. Return of Alcibiades – Ever since Tharsybulus restored the democracy at Samos he had strongly insisted that Alcibiades should be recalled; the other Athenian leaders were of the same mind, and at last the consent of the army was obtained at an assembly which voted his return and full pardon.  Thrasybulus then sailed to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades to Samos, convinced that there was no hope for the Athenians unless by his means.  Tissaphernes could be drawn away from the Peloponnesians.  An assembly was called, at which Alcibiades lamented the cruel an unjust fate which had banished him; he then spoke at length of their political prospects; and bright indeed were the hopes of future victory with which he inspired them, while he magnified to excess his present influence over Tissaphernes . . . Tissaphernes, he said had promised him that if he could only trust the Athenians they should not want for food while he had anything to give, no not if he were driven at last to turn his own bed into money; that he would bring up the Phoenician ships (which were already at Aspendus) to assist the Athenians instead of the Peloponnesians; but that he could not trust the Athenians unless Alcibiades were restored and became surety for them. pp. 603-604

211. Failings of Both Oligarchy and Democracy – This was the political pretext of which they availed themselves, but the truth was that most of them were given up to private ambition of the sort which is more fatal than anything to the oligarchy succeeding a democracy.  For the instant an oligarchy is established the promoters of it disdain mere equality, and everybody thinks that he ought to be far above everybody else.  Whereas in a democracy, when an election is made, a man is less disappointed at a failure because he has not been competing with his equals.  The motives which most sensibly affected them were the great power of Alcibiades at Samos, and an impression that the oligarchy was not likely to be permanent.  Accordingly every one was struggling hard to be the first champion of the people himself.

212. Polity – the Best – When the news came the Athenians in their extremity still contrived to man twenty ships, and immediately summoned an assembly (the first of many) in the placed called the Pnyx, where they had always been in the habit of meeting; at which assembly they deposed the Four Hundred, and voted that the government should be in the hands of the Five Thousand; this number was to include all who could furnish themselves with arms.  No one was to receive pay for holding any office, on pain of falling under a curse.  In the numerous other assemblies which were afterward held they re-appointed Nomothetae, and by a series of decrees established a constitution.  This government during its early days was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed with my memory.  Oligarchy and Democracy were duly attempted.  And thus after the miserable state into which she had fallen, the city was again able to raise her head,  The people also passed a vote recalling Alcibiades and others from exile, and sending to him and to the army in Samos exhorted them to act vigorously.  p. 618 – BC 411

 Index to Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War

Alcibiades:  First introduced – 132, Nicias rips on Alcibiades – 147, Those against Alcibiades – 150, Alcibiades brags – 151, Athenian’s mistake in driving out Alcibiades – 152, Olympic triumph – 153, Benefits Athens at his own expense – 154, Disparages the mixed-multitude of Sicily – 155, Call to support alliances – 156, Goal of the war – to humble Sparta – 157, Arrest of Alcibiades ordered by prejudice investigation – 159, False witness against Alcibiades– 161, Alcibiades condemned – 162, Speaks to the Spartans – 166a-f, Follies of Democracy – 166a, War plan – 166b, Advice to the Spartans – 166c, True enemies of Athens – 166d, Definition of a true patriot – 166e, What Alcibiades has to offer to Sparta – 166f, Alcibiades changes sides again – 200, Alcibiades advices the Persians play the Greeks against each other – 201, Alcibiades Real Motivation – 202, Attack against Alcibiades – 203, Peisander on ending the democracy and bringing back Alcibiades – 204, Return of Alcibiades – 210, Faiing of both oligarchy and democracy – 211, Polity the best government – 212.

Archeology: Only a guess – 4.

Archidamus: King of Sparta – 23, On war – 24, On Athenian Resolve – 25, On Spartan Resolve – 26, On the hardest school – 27, Speaks on starting a War – 45a&b, Freedom – 52h, Calls off attack due to “signs” – 133.

Athens: Compared to Sparta – 20, Empire develops – 21, Resolve – 25, Use of mercenaries – 35, Never Yield – 43a, Wealth – 47, Walls – 48, Country life – 50, Metics also fought – 51, Cemetery – 52a, Freedom a gift of the Ancestors – 52c, Empire a gift of the fathers – 52d, Riches a gift to ourselves – 52e, Form of Government – 52f, Equality of opportunity – 52g, Unwritten Laws – 52g, Pleasure – 52i, Trade – 52j, Military training superior – 52k, Open City – 52l, Fight for city – 52q, The Plague – 53a-i, Their fleet – 65, Reasons for war – 142, Athenian forces depart for Sicily – 158,  Athens Empire established out of liberation of Hellenes from Persia – 164a, Defeat in Sicily – Book VII, 168-190, Supply line cut – 165, Burdon of two wars – 166, Slaughter and murder by Thracians – 167, Winner defined – 168, Technology and Tactics – 169, Nicias’ Failures – 170, Demosthenes wants to leave – 171, Nicas falters – 172,  Political considerations = evil – 173, Eclipse of the Moon – false Omen – 174, Athenian defeat at sea – 175, Syracusans murder prisoners of war – 176, Defeat at Sea – Final Straw – 177, Syracusans Close the Harbor – 178, Nicias Final Call to Action – 179, Gylippus’ call for Vengeance – 180, Motivation in Battle – 181, Armies watch battle from shore – 182, The retreat begins – 183, The retreat – 184, Men constitute the state – 185, Disaster at the River Crossing – 186, Captives placed in the quarries – 187, Death of Nicias and Demosthenes – 188, Suffering in the quarries – 189, Greatest war – 190, Athenians blame others – forget their own vote – 191, Implication of the Loss in Sicily – 192, They will not give way – 193, Constitutional Convention – 207, Destruction of Athens’ freedom – 208.

Barbarians: Ineffectual soldiers – 124, Slaughter and murder by Thracians – 167.

Cleon: Cleon’s speech against Mitylenaeans – Calling for the death of the Mitylenaeans – 72, Warns of dangers of “persuasive speakers” – 73, Despise v respect – 74, Stick to your decisions – 75, Justice v expedient – 76, Cleon’s “evil” advice kills the peace – 110, Fulfills his promise – 116, Cleon and Brasidas die in a day – 125.

Colonies: Corinth’s revolt – 15.

Corinth: Corinth’s Colonies call for revolt – 15, Calls for war – 34.

Country Life: Around Athens – 50.

Delphi and Omens: Promise to Sparta – 33, Prophesy fulfilled – 53i, Eclipse of the Moon – false Omen – 174.

Delos: Seat of Alliance – 30.

Democracy: Follies of democracy according to Alcibiades – 166a, Nicas complains of the difficulty of leading in a democracy – 167, When democracy works – 194.  

Diodotus speech on Mitylenaeans – In defense of Mitylenaeans – 77, Bad council = haste and passion – 78, Evil power of slander – 79, Argument better than either accusation or slander – 80, Those in the know, responsible – 81, Our interests – justice and expedience – 82, Spare the Mitylenaeans – 82a, Death penalty not a deterrent – 83, Give them a way out – 84, Allow repentance – 85, Better way than severity – 86, Mercy better than justice – 87.

Dorian Invasion: After the Trojan War – 8.

Economic Pressures: Role of property ownership – 43d.

Education: In Athens – 52m, Athenian training method – 52n.

Enemy of Your Enemy is Your Friend – 16.

Ephors: Wall up the King in the Temple – 41.

Fortune: Beyond control – 121, Melians – Fortunes of War – 140l, Athenians – The flaw with hope – 140m, Athenians – Self-evident truth – 140q.

Freedom: Personal life – 52h, Freedom over slavers – 125, Melians – We should suffer for freedom – 140j.

Guerilla War: Dangers of “Guerilla War” – 111.

Hellenes: Named of King Hellen – 3.

Hippias’ brother’s death and its revenge (a look back) – 160. 

Honor: By deeds – 52b.

Immigration: Athens and “open city” – 52l.

Justice: Justice and injustice – 15, Justice and Expedience – 18, Justice and Violence – 22, Unjust, killing prisoners – 39, War Crimes – 60, Justice v expedient (Cleon) – 76, Death penalty not a deterrent – 83, Mercy better than justice (Diodotus) – 87, Plataeans seek Justice from Sparta – 88, Melians – and appeal to Justice – 140a, Athenians – Might makes right – 140b.

Killing Prisoners: Unjust act – 39, Corcyraeans murder the Oligarchs – 117, Syracusans murder prisoners of war – 176, Suffering in the quarries – 189.

King: Hellen gives his name to the people – 3, Theseus set up Athens – 49, Authority, command of the Spartan King – 134.

Love:  Love of Beauty – 52o, Love of Athens.

Math: Using math to prepare for battel – 67.

Melian Debate: Back and forth of speeches –140a-u, Melians – and appeal to Justice – 140a, Athenians – Might makes right – 140b, Melians – Expedience and Justice – 140c, Athenians – Who the enemy is – 140d, Melians – Masters and slaves – 140e, Athenians – Advantages, yours and ours – 140f, Back and forth – 140g, Melians – Expedience – 140h, Athenians – Who we fear – 140i, Melians – We should suffer for freedom – 140j, Athenians – We are too strong for you – 140k, Melians – Fortunes of war – 140l, Athenians – The flaw with hope – 140m, Melians – Faith in the Gods and the Lacedaemonians – 140n, Athenians – God’s favor – 140o, Athenians – Self-evident truth – 140p, Athenians – Failings of the Spartans – 140q, Athenians – Justice v Expedience – 140r, Athenians – Path to safety – 140s, Melians – Final decision – 140t, Athenians – response – 140u.

Melians – Expedience and Justice – 140c, Melians – Expedience – 140h, Justice v Expedience – 140r, Nicias on Self Interest – 144, Expedience – 165.

Melos: Athens sends ships to Melos – 104, Fall of Melos – 141.

Mercenaries: Athenians use – 35, Unreliable – 43g.

Metics: Also fought – 51, Fight – 64.

Mitylenaeans: Mitylenaeans debate alliance with Athens – 61, Mitylenaean’s alliance conditional – 62, Debate on killing the Mitylenaeans – 70-87,

Natural Gifts v Learned Skills: Naturel gifts – 36.

Naval Power: Skills valuable – 43f, Athenian fleet – 65, Hoplites row the boats – 66, Rowers (Oarsmen) also soldiers, not slaves – 112.

Neolithic Times: Nomadic people – 2.

Nicias: Speech before the Sicilian campaign – 143-149, Nicas against war – 143, Nicias on self-interest – 144, Speaks his mind – 145, Against spending money on foreign wars – 146, Rips on Alcibiades – 147, Nicias on bad allies – 148, Nicias on good magistrates – 149, Nicas complains of the difficulty of leading in a democracy – 167, Nicias’ failures – 170, Nicas falters – 172, Nicias final call to action – 179, Death of Nicias and Demosthenes – 188.

Peace: Sparta offers peace / chances of war – 108, Fruits of Peace – 109, Why don’t we make peace? – 119, Both sides want – 127, Six-year truce – 129.

Pericles: Praised – 40, Answer to Sparta’s ultimatum – 43, Don’t try to extend empire – 43i, Answer to demands of the Lacedaemonians – 43j, How to win a war – 43k, Suspicions against (think Trump and Putin) – 46, Funeral Oration – 52a-r, Blamed for setbacks – 53, Last Speech 55a-I, On winning and losing – 56, His greatness – 57.  

Pericles Last Speech: Never give up – 55a, Athens – master of the seas – 55b, On freedom – 55c, War based on reason – 55d, Glory takes work – 55e, Tyranny of empire – 55f, Don’t blame me – 55g, Fickleness of masses – 55h, Death of Pericles – 55i.

Piraeus: Themistocles finishes the building – 29.

Persian Involvement: For Spartans – 195-199, 1) Tissaphernes appointed – 195, Lacedaemonian alliance with Persia – 196, Persia pays – 198, New treaty between Persia and Lacedaemonians – 199, Third treaty with the Persians – 205.

Plague: Doctors die – a, Thucydides had – 53b, Described – 53c, Birds and dogs die – 53d, No one got twice – 53e, Laws, human and divine, ignored – 53f, Lawlessness – 53g, Religion out – 53h, Prophesy fulfilled – 53i, Impact of the plague – 103.  

Plataeans Destroyed by Sparta: Debate and Destruction – 88-95, Plataeans seek justice – 88 Plataean defense – 89, Appeal to the Law of Arms – 90, Reasons for mercy – 91, Theban excuse for siding with Persia – 92, Thebans condemnation of Plataeans – 93, Murder of Plataeans – 94, Murder in the Senate – 95.

Pleasure: Of free life in Athens – 52i.  

Power: Motivates Spartan action – 32.

Politics: Role of property – 43d, Weakness of confederacy – 43e, Pericles successors fail – 58, Commons revolt once armed – 68, Generals punished for making peace – 122, False witness against Alcibiades granted immunity – 161, Political considerations = evil – 173, Athenians blame others – forget their own vote – 191, Destruction of Athenian freedom – 208, Lies and Civil War.

Revolution: Evils of revolution – Murder of prisoners – 96, Calamities of war / evils of revolution – 97, “Party” and love of power, the cause of evil – 99, Inferior intellects succeed best – 100, Coup by the Oligarchs – 206.

Resources: Athens equal to Sparta and their allies – 43c.

Revenge: Revenge not good, no guarantee of victory – 120.

Service: Doing good to others – 52p.

Ships: Corinth built the first triremes – 9.

Sicilian City calls for Athenian help: The call – 102.

Skill: value – 163, Hard work over comes want of discipline – 164.

Soldiers: Rowers are warrior – 7, Athenians fight for their city – 52q.

Socialism: Covetousness and enmity – Socialism and blind hate – 101.

Sparta: Laws good – 10, Compared to Athens – 20, Resolve – 26, The hardest school – 27, Motivated by Athenian Power – 32, Promise from Delphi – 33, Plague aids promise of Delphi – 53i, Plataeans seek Justice from Sparta – 88, Spartan surrender – 115, Brasidas in Acanthus – 123, Authority, command of the Spartan King – 134, All Spartans are officers – 135, Spartan numbers and formation – 136, Spartan marching to music – 137, Each soldier covers his comrade – 138, Win by courage alone – 139, Gylippus’ call for vengeance – 180.

Speeches: How Thucydides will present – 13, Pericles on the war – 42 a – k,  Nicias before the  Sicilian campaign – 143-149.

Themistocles: Calls for a wall – 28, On the Piraeus – 29, Becomes a great man in Persia – 42.

Thermopylae: To compare small things with great – 114.

Theseus: Sets up Athens – 49.

Thucydides -  How Thucydides will present speeches– 13, Thucydides had the plague– 53b, Count of dates – 128, Banished for twenty years – 131.

Trade: Basis of Athenian wealth – 52j.

Training:  Athens’s superior – 52k, Protect your comrades – 138.

Unwritten Laws – transgression = recognition of general sentiment – 52h, Appeal to the Law of Arms – 90.

U. S Government: Second Amendment – 6, Compare to Athens and Sparta – 20, Freedom a gift of the ancestors – 52c, Empire a gift of the fathers – 52d, Riches a gift to ourselves – 52e, Democracy as a form of government – 52f, Equality of opportunity – 52g, Freedom – 52h, Unwritten Laws – 52g, Commons revolt once armed – 68, Athenians – self-evident truth – 140p, Constitutional Convention – 207.

Walls: Themistocles calls for a wall – 28, Long Walls – 31, Of Athens – 48.

War: Greatest War – 12, Happen again – 14, Importance of this war – 1, Persian War, aftermath and process – 11, Inevitable – 18, Battle (Cheimerium) described – 19, Corinthian call for war – 34, Dangers – 37, Assures peace – 38, Pericles call to be firm – 43b, Property and owners – 43d, Naval skills valuable – 43f, Mercenaries unreliable – 43g, Men more important than houses or land – 43h, Don’t try to extend empire – 43i, How to win (Pericles) 43k, Beginnings, full of energy – 44, Danger of overconfidence (Archidamus) – 45a, Steps to victory (Archidamus) 45b,  Defeated, how Athens lost, Persian involvement – 59, War crimes – 60, Preemptive war – 63, The metics fight – 64, General’s key to success – 69, Appeal to the Law of Arms – 90, Keep the soldiers busy – 106, Athenian v Lacedaemonian military excellence – 107, Dangers of “Guerilla War” – 111, Rowers (Oarsmen) also soldiers, not slaves – 112, Value of missile weapons – 113, Why war – 118, Why don’t we make peace? – 119, Barbarians are ineffectual soldiers – 124, War lasts 27 years – 130, Protect your comrades in battle – 138, Reasons for war – 142, Winner defined – 168, Technology and tactics – 169, Motivation in battle – 181, Armies watch battle from shore – 182, Greatest war – 190, Implication of the loss in Sicily – 192, The Athenians will not give way – 193, Retreat better than defeat – 197.

Words: Changing the meanings of words – 98.

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